The New Nation - Internet Edition

Saeed Shehabi

Iraq has never had shortage of contentious issues that had often led to internal feuding, factional clashes, sectarian strife or political stagnation. The State Of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) that has recently been debated, signed by Nouri Al Maliki's Government and approved by the Iraqi Parliament, is just another of these contentious issues.

The opposition and grievances my disappear after three years if its articles are fully implemented and the US combat forces leave Iraq, or may remain to haunt those who had signed it if the US adopts more aggressive occupational policies.

Still, the past few months have seen clear political and ideological polarisation between political parties between supporters and opponents of the deal. The most notable objectors are the Sadrist Movement which has vehemently rejected any deal with what it terms "the occupiers". Its Parliamentary Members, as well as its supporters in the street have put a strong opposition to one of the most controversial political step by the Al Maliki's Government.

While the Sunni political parties have sought to draw some political concessions on domestic issues, the Shi'a have been clearly divided over the deal, with massive demonstrations, boycott of or walkout from the Parliament.

What is the SOFA agreement that is instigating these sharp responses? A year ago, during an official visit by Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al Maliki, to Washington, a broad agreement was signed that within twelve months a strategic agreement would be concluded between Iraq and the US, based on broad terms that did not evoke hostile reactions at the time. However, as the US Presidential elections got underway in the summer, the Bush administration moved rapidly on the issue and presented an extensive agreement to the Iraqi side for approval.

It consisted of two parts; the first was a strategic political, economic and cultural framework whilst the second dealt with the US forces in Iraq with a framework for eventual withdrawal. While the larger and probably more significant strategic framework has not received great attention, the SOFA agreement caused furore among the political figures and parties. There were five controversial clauses that received particular attention; the conditions attached to the withdrawal plan, the immunity of the American service personnel from prosecution by Iraq's judiciary, the postal services used by the US troops, the detention and interrogation of Iraqi suspects and the use of Iraqi soil for launching attacks against neighbours.

The Iraqi Government was adamant that these clauses be amended so as not to compromise its sovereignty. Eventually, Washington apparently conceded to most of these demands, though there still remains confusion and uncertainty as to how far the US would abide by the terms and the spirit of the agreement.

After weeks of political and media debates, the Iraqi Government finally signed the agreement before submitting it to the Parliament. The Sadrist Movement led the rebellion against it. The religious leadership, represented by Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Al Sistani, gave a muted response to the deal, calling first for a Parliamentary debate and consensus and then a referendum. He added a further condition for a consensus by the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds on the agreement.

Among the greatest surprises has been the muted response by the religious parties representing the Sunni Muslims. Unlike the Sadrist Movement who openly opposed the deal and organised demonstrations, seminars and walkouts from Parliament, no such stands were taken by the Al Tawafuq Alliance (the main Sunni block in Parliament). The Sunni areas of Iraq did not see major demonstrations against the agreement.

Tehran has been incensed by what it sees as legalizing the American occupation of Iraq through the agreement. It has called on the Iraqis not to sign the deal and called for the immediate withdrawal of the US forces. The agreement envisages that the forces would remain in Iraq until December 31, 2011, and that they would withdraw from Iraqi streets by the end of June 2009.

Tehran appears to be on the brink of a new chapter in its relations with Washington, especially after Barrack Obama's victory in the Presidential elections. The extent of the behind-the-scene contacts between Tehran and Washington in the last few weeks is not clear, but the cooling off in the confrontational policies is a sign of a degree of understanding unseen since the Islamic Revolution three decades ago. The standoff in the confrontational policies on the nuclear issue is partly due to the undeclared understanding between Tehran and Washington. Despite Iran's unease vis-à-vis the deal between Iraq and the US, there is a general relief that the American occupation of Iraq may come to an end within the next three years. President-elect Obama has repeatedly asserted that he intended to withdraw the US forces within sixteen months, ie, before the date set by the SOFA agreement.

Despite what is seen as "legalisation" of the occupation by the SOFA agreement, the Iraqi Government has shown a degree of brinkmanship that Washington had not anticipated. Al Maliki Government has made the best of a bad situation. It also seems that several factors have worked to its advantage; the expected change in the White House following the election of Obama, the wind of change that is sweeping over the Iran-US relations, the weakening of the Al Qa'ida in Iraq that had adopted a sectarian agenda and the emergence of an Iraqi consensus that has been lacking since the downfall of Saddam's regime in 2003.

The Iraqis now believe that they have successfully returned the ball to the American court and it is up to Washington to abide by its commitment to withdraw its forces from Iraq in accordance with the SOFA agreement.