The New Nation - Internet Edition

Claude Salhani

The next US president will have the advantage of a honeymoon -- typically about 100 days -- and it is crucial not to waste that time.

During this time, all parties concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict will give the president the benefit of the doubt.

The new president should very carefully think out his initial approach to the conflict, and his ideas about a resolution. The Middle East stakeholders will be keen to listen to his first statements, and his words will dictate their reactions to what they think of as his administration's 'roadmap'. Showing partisanship towards one side would alienate the other and would foil efforts to restart the peace talks and leave them as they are -- that is to say, not only in 'park position', but also with the emergency brake fully engaged.

The next administration must demonstrate to both Arabs and Israelis that it is serious in its efforts to solve the crisis, and that it understands that without the direct involvement of the United States, peace in the Middle East can never be achieved.

The president must convince the Arabs that there is no alternative to a peaceful solution. And he needs to convince the Israelis of the same -- reminding them that the United States is committed to the security of Israel, but that time is not on their side. The new administration should make it understood by all sides how imperative it is that a peace deal be reached sooner rather than later.

The point must be stressed to the Israeli leadership that peace means making concessions - sometimes-painful ones -- but the dividends of peace far out weight the alternative.

The foundations for peace between the Arabs and the Israelis are well known: Give or take five or 10 per cent, says former Israeli National Security Council director Giora Eiland, the best blueprint for peace is still the plan conceived by former president Bill Clinton. But peace between Israel and the Arabs depends on establishing a two-track process, both proceeding at the same time.

The first track involves Syria and Israel. Syria is prepared to offer Israel peace in return for the Golan Heights. A demilitarised zone several miles wide on either side of the Syrian-Israeli border could be established and placed under US military control. The presence of American troops in a DMZ would re-assure the Israelis, with Syrian troops positioned on their side of the DMZ and Israelis on the other.

To neutralise the precariousness that prevails along Israel's Lebanese border due to Hezbollah's presence, any peace deal between Syria and Israel must include a peace agreement with Lebanon. Omitting Lebanon would be a grave error, giving Syria an "escape clause." The inclusion of Lebanon is paramount to the success of the accord with Syria. Here's why.

Including Lebanon in the peace process - which means finalising the status of the Shebaa Farms currently occupied by Israel -- would remove Hezbollah's stated reasons for maintaining its armed wing. The inclusion of Lebanon as part of a package deal is important because without Syria, the Lebanese are far too divided to attempt direct talks on their own.

Additionally, Lebanon's inclusion would solve two other problems. First, it would end the state of belligerency between Israel and all its neighbours; and second, it would help stabilise the political situation in Lebanon.

The return of the Golan would be conditional on Damascus distancing itself from Teheran and in the process severing the link Hezbollah has to Iran.

The simultaneous second track is resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, in which the following conditions are to be addressed:

1. Final borders

2. The "right of return" of Palestinian refugees

3. The status of Jerusalem

The final position of the frontier dividing the future state of Palestine and Israel is mostly known by both sides. The resolution of the final border could be left to a sub-committee to finalise. In the interim, security in Palestine can be assumed by international bodies such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe - as was the case in Kosovo - or another neutral force.

The right of return of Palestinian refugees is a demand that Israel will never agree to, given the security implications. One possible solution is to offer financial compensation to refugees who would be unable to return. In the long run, it would be far less costly than what Washington currently spends furnishing Israel with weapons.

Others could be offered citizenship in the future state of Palestine or another Arab country, or an option of an Israeli passport without right of residency. Visitation rights would be looked at on an individual basis. There is a precedent for this when Great Britain issued "B-Type" passports to tens of thousands of Asian workers who were expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin.

Thirdly, the status of Jerusalem could be left to be decided in five years time -- once greater confidence has been established between the parties.

There remains the issue of Gaza. This is where Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, particularly Qatar, can be influential.

Finally, none of this can be realised without the full backing and prestige of the president of the United States and his secretary of state.

In view of the intensity and the hand-on demands such negotiations will involve, it would benefit the president to appoint a cabinet-level negotiator to the position.

(Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times and a political analyst in Washington)