The New Nation - Internet Edition

Though there may be a spring in the step of Russians now, the reality is that their military and society are not nearly as strong as they would like to think. By David Watts

REVERSING LOSSES: Of late Moscow has been handing out passports to many South Ossetians so as to give a modicum of credibility to Russian claim that they were acting in defence of their own

Welcome to the old world order or international politics as it always has been except in the view of right-wing think tanks and strategists along the Potomac.

Moscow has given the West a renewed lesson in realpolitik but it is far from clear who will take away the most significant gains, long-term brickbats and benefits from the revival of the Cold War in the Caucasus. But all the indications are that it will play out into a frustrating draw that will only serve to inflame the competitive instincts of either side.

With Russia's troops taking their time about leaving Georgia and Moscow making it clear that it reserves the right to keep some sort of presence on the ground it is time to assess the intermediate results of the 21st Century's first overt attempt to check the expansion of western influence.

The commentocracy appears to view the proceedings as a hands-down loss for the West: a stretch too far and the long-awaited come-uppance for the arrogant assumption of the Americans that the world is their playground which they can shape to their model at will. In the short-term this much is certain: there won't be too many small countries launching military adventures over the next few years and then sitting back and waiting for the cavalry to come over the hill. As the Georgians found out, there is no cavalry available just now and even if there were other important people have a view on that.

The Russians had been waiting to prove a point for some years, only no one in power in Washington seems to have taken them seriously. Ever since the expansion of Nato up to the borders of Russia at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been waiting for an opportunity to start redressing the balance.

As Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute notes, the expansion of Nato into Georgia and Ukraine is 'fundamentally different' from the incorporation of the other former members of the Soviets bloc. As a result, the Russians had been steadily strengthening their links with South Ossetia over the years - most recently by handing out passports to many of its citizens so as to give a modicum of credibility to their claim that they were acting in defence of their own.

President Mikheil Saakashvili's posturing gave him the chance. A product of the American legal system, the Georgian president learned all the right buttons to push, during his sojourn in the United States, to win the hearts and minds of the neo-cons. One of the difficulties, for former president Vladimir Putin not least, was the fact that he is still a Georgian at heart. At home he used the army in an overt use of power from which even Putin would shrink on his own territory; he brought the press under control; there is but a single, state-controlled television outlet in the country and the military has been used to break up strikes; hardly the stuff of democracy. All the more frustrating then for Putin to see this man using so many devices straight out of his own Kremlin play book while waving the flags of Nato and western democracy on his doorstep.

Don't forget that when Russians last went to the polls the exercise produced such scepticism in the West that monitors were brought into play. So from the Kremlin's viewpoint the western establishment of yet another outpost on Russia's border, closing a ring which, in the Russian perception, already stretches round to the very farthest eastern outposts of Central Asia, was something that must be weakened at all cost.

The Russians, above all, want to be taken seriously as a world and military power with interests that should be respected. And this crass adventure so redolent of the clumsy, brutal Russian bear of old has certainly put down the marker that was intended. As President Dmitri Medvedev said as the Russian pullout got underway: 'We do not want to aggravate the situation, but we want to be respected and our government to be respected and our people to be respected and our values.' What values he had in mind he did not say but this is certainly not the moment to be preaching to Russia about values. And notably few western politicians did, preferring discretion as the better part of valour and recognising, as the Russians implied, that the greatest damage has been done to the country's image and reputation.

It was the most striking use of Russian power since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and though only a 'police action' against a minor formerly vassal state, the Russian military did not cover itself with glory. The air force, in particular, must be licking its wounds. The defence ministry admitted the loss of four aircraft over five days including a Tupolev Tu 22 long range strategic reconnaissance bomber and three Sukhoi 25 ground attack aircraft. The Georgians claimed many more which seems unlikely but no Russian military official can be happy with that loss ratio. The tally may be an indicator of how successful has been the relatively brief period of western training that the Georgians have enjoyed and the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft weaponry that they bought from the Israelis. It must have been a wake-up call to the Russian military as to the potential for the improvement of the capability of the regional militaries that come into contact with Nato methods and procedures, a process that could be repeated in Ukraine and elsewhere.

But while Russia's shock tactics may have put a spring in the step of Russians, the reality is that their military and society are not nearly as strong as they would like to think. Up to 700,000 Russians die of alcoholism every year and there are two million registered alcoholics while as many as 1.3 million people suffer from Aids. Mortality rates are some of the worst in the world and this is a nation in decline while even its phenomenal oil revenues hide weaknesses in industry. That knowledge helps drive Russian policy-making but also helps feed Russian paranoia about encirclement and victimhood.

Not exacerbating the latter is an important part of Nato's response to the crisis which so far wants to have its cake and eat it too by both freezing relations with Moscow but maintaining links so as not to jeopardise the energy supplies on which Europe is now so dependent.

As a first step it would seem important for Nato to reach a consensus on how far and how fast to drive an expansion policy which is now in danger of damaging the very peace that it is supposed to maintain. As Prof Clarke points out, there is a substantial difference between the admission of Georgia and Ukraine and the other nations who have so far joined.

(Source: Asian Affairs)