The New Nation - Internet Edition

Sudhirendar Sharma

Each major flood in Bihar echoes the demand for a high dam in upper reaches of Nepal. But Kathmandu suspects India's special fondness for its water resources and argues that neither high dam nor its exaggerated benefits favour her. Having received raw deal in the previous water-sharing arrangements, including the 1953 Kosi and 1959 Gandak treaties, Nepal hasn't been supportive of Delhi's demand. The present deluge upstream of the Bhimnagar barrage on Kosi has only amplified the accumulated aspersions.

As member of the independent fact-finding mission in early March, the dilapidated state of the barrage could not convince us that it could carry its designed discharge of 950,000 cusecs. The silt choked east and the west bank canals emanating from the barrage, their combined irrigation capacities reduced by two-third on account of defunct silt ejectors, could only add pressure on the main structure and the embankments upstream.

Sharing preliminary findings with the press, the fact finding mission had warned: `..not only are floods in Bihar manmade but that the worse has yet to come should political economy of flood control continue to promote `embankment' as only solution to the scourge of floods.'

Delhi has got its flood action plan consistently wrong over the years, and so has Patna. Yet, both never stop either blaming the rains or Kathmandu for it. Like floods, it is an annual ritual for politicians in Bihar to reiterate that Nepal has released water and that a high dam is the only solution to control floods. Little do unsuspecting masses realize that if there is no dam how water could be stored upstream? But the myth persists!

Shockingly, however, flood control measures over the years have turned north Bihar into

watery grave for millions. Jacketing the silt-laden rivers has helped flood prone area increase three fold in the state since independence, from a low of 25 lakh to a high of 68 lakh hectare today. It amounts to no less than 73 per cent of the entire land mass that remains prone under normal floods.

It is tragic that a worst flood only sends alarming signals, emergency aerial surveys and

fresh relief packages being the temporary outcome. That over 2 million people are permanently trapped between the flood control embankments and an estimated 8 million are faced with acute water-logging outside of the embankments are hard facts that continue to get ignored, year after year.

What instead gets attention is jacketing of the rivers, over 3,465 km long embankments have been built in Bihar since 1952. More are in the offing; a Rs. 792 crore package to tame the Bagmati has been approved and another proposal to embank the tributaries of Mahananda at an estimated cost of Rs 850 crore has been planned. The business of embankment building reflects politician-bureaucrat-contractor nexus at its best.

But for those who stand to gain from it, embankment efficacy has always been suspect. Engineer Captain F.C. Hirst, in 1908, had commented, 'in recent times, on the left bank of the Kosi, in the Purnea district, private enterprise has copied the work of the makers of the Bir Band, giving temporary relief, which, as will be seen later, is probably a menace to `future welfare'. This century old observation has proved prophetic ever since.

Embankments may work on those rivers that are stable and carry moderate silt load. Kosi, in contrast, is a meandering river with maximum available energy producing currents. Having drifted 160 km in past 250 years, the natural tendency of meandering Kosi disproves the traditional 'steady-state' equilibrium approach of the engineers. Once embanked, its incredible silt load only adds to its defiant nature. The embankments have proven counterproductive in the case of Kosi, arresting the natural dispersion of sediment on the floodplains, thereby increasing deposition, raising the level of riverbed and later breaking of embankments, causing floods and water-logging. Thanks to embankments, Kosi riverbed has risen by 12-15 feet on account of silt deposition that otherwise would have been spread on the floodplains.

It is erroneous to assume that north Bihar is geographical positioned to remain flooded. Conversely, it's the state's arrogance and misplaced faith in engineering that has stopped these rivers from performing their natural task of land building. Without the nurturing role of these rivers, Bihar would never have become the apex centre of knowledge. The

collapse of this knowledge culture within the state is an outcome of embankment.

Can high dam over Kosi reverse Bihar's misfortune? Like the embankments, the chances for this Rs 35,000 crore guess (estimated cost of 269 mt high dam) to go wrong are self evident. While silt deposition by the river is one major issue impacting dam's lifespan, its proposed location in Nepal's Brahashetra will capture only 78 per cent of river's catchment leaving significant 22 per cent flows dangerously unattended.

What then is the option? Having failed to tame rivers Rhine and Meuse, the Dutch hydrocracy has come to the conclusion that absolute safety from flooding could not be guaranteed through technical-infrastructural measures. Adopting spatial flood protection measures, they are now implementing `room for the river' approach with broad political support. It is measures like these that need to be negotiated with Kathmandu, but not before the political stables in Patna (and in Delhi) get cleansed of their misconceptions!

An Ashoka Fellowship Initiative (www.ashoka.org), the multidisciplinary fact-finding mission included engineers, hydrologists, sociologists and environmentalists with an aim to get an in-depth assessment of the perpetual flood cycle in north Bihar. The author has been a member of this independent mission.