The New Nation - Internet Edition

Zahid Al Amin

By dint of the proliferation of high-tech media and due to complex world politics, the natures of the international media and journalistic practice have been on continuous change. Every stage in the current era, different concepts and exercises in this field have been emerging which have obvious impact on different aspects of our life, especially when we claim ourselves as members of 'global village'. 'Embedded Journalism' is such a concept in this field, which has been emerged as a mass and much talked issue all over the world just after the US invasion of Iraq. This article focuses on how the US Government threw the whole nation in dark about the real picture of the war as well as the motive of imposing such invasion on oil-rich Iraq through 'embedded journalism' practice.

Embedded journalists are reporters who accompany a specific military unit during their wartime assignment and report on what they see and observe while with that unit. While the term could be applied to many historical interactions between jourpalists and military personnel, it first came to be used in the media coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The United States military responded to pressure from the country's news media who were disappointed by the level of access granted during the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2001 U S invasion of Afghanistan.

At the start of the war in March of 2003, as many as 775 reporters and photographers were travelling as embedded journalists. These reporters signed contracts with the military that limited what they were allowed to report on. When asked why the military decided to embed journalists with the troops, Lt. Co1. Rick Long of the U S Marine Corps replied, "Frankly, our job is to win the war. Part of that is information warfare. So, we are going to attempt to dominate the information environment."

Gina Cavallaro, a reporter for the Army Times, said, "They're [the journalists] relying more on the military to get them where they want to go, and as a result, the military is getting smarter about getting its own story told." Though many of us are acquainted with the term embeded journalism greatly after the U S invasion on Iraq, it has an ancient root in the history. Embedding is really the norm of American journalism which was also practiced in the World War II. During the War many reporters and photographers went ashore with official approval in Normandy or on islands in the Pacific, slogged it out, and died with the troops.

A partnership between the military and the media has changed the nature of war journalism. Journalists are experiencing unprecedented access to the battlefield thanks to a partnership between the military and the media that has embedded journalists within specific military units. The embedded reporters have to follow several agreed upon rules as they live with the soldiers and report on their actions.

The new arrangement was formed out of meetings between the heads of news organisations and the Defence Department officials aimed at allowing journalists to report on war with the least possible danger.

Before joining their battalions, the embedded journalists had to sign a contract restricting when and what they can report. The details of military actions can only be described in general terms and journalists agreed not to write at all about possible future missions or about classified weapons and information they might find.

In addition, the commander of an embedded journalist's unit can declare a 'blackout,' meaning the reporter is prohibited from filing stories via satellite connection. The blackouts are called for security reasons, as a satellite communication could tip off a unit's location to enemy forces, the Pentagon explains.

The portrait of Iraq that Americans have received from the news media has in considerable measure been a grim one. Roughly half of the reporting has consisted of accounts of daily violence. And stories that explicitly assessed the direction of the war have tended toward pessimism, according to a new study of press coverage of events on the ground in Iraq from January through October of 2007.

In what Defence Department statistics show to be the deadliest year so far for U S forces in Iraq, journalists have responded to the challenge of covering the continuing violence by keeping many of the accounts of these attacks brief and limiting the interpretation they contain. And as the year went on, the narrative from Iraq in some ways brightened. The drumbeat of reports about daily attacks declined in late summer and fall, and with that came a decline in the amount of coverage from Iraq overall.

This shift in coverage beginning in June, in turn, coincided with a rising sense among the American public that military efforts in Iraq were going "very" or "fairly well."

These are some of the findings of a study of more than 1,100 stories from January through October from 40 different news outlets conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, a non-partisan, non-ideological research institute that examines the press.

The findings suggest, among other things, that the bigger question may be not how the press interprets events but what kind of events get covered, especially by a press corps whose movements are severely restricted in Iraq by the threat of attack and who are the most mobile when embedded with U S troops.

The results of the study of the content of Iraq coverage also correlate to a great extent with attitudes expressed by journalists working in Iraq themselves. In a survey released by the Project in November, most journalists said they felt that the operations of the military were thoroughly covered, but they viewed the lives of ordinary Iraqis and the sense of daily life as the most "under covered" subject. The findings here about what topics were covered tend to confirm the assessment of the journalists on the ground.

Some observers wondered how much the embedded reporting would be about actual fighting or whether the embedded reporters would be limited to "feel good" stories about troop morale, supply lines, maneuvers and preparations. Anyone who imagined the embedded reporting wouldn't focus on the actual battlefront was mistaken.

Stories about combat or its results made up 41% of all the embedded reports studied. Cable news was even more likely than average to focus on actual combat or the results, accounting for roughly half (47%) of the embedded stories studied, compared with 35% on the broadcast networks.

Not surprisingly, the percentage of stories that focused on combat and its results rose over time. The first two days of the study, Friday March 21, as the ground forces were just beginning to move, and Saturday the 22nd, 31% of embedded stories were about military action and the results of that action. By March 24, that number doubled to 61%.

The second biggest topic of the embedded stories studied was pre-combat activity, such as troop movements or military strategy. Roughly a third of the stories focused on such matters, 32%.

Another 16% of stories focused on military issues such as troop morale, the jobs of specific soldiers, or the role of certain pieces of equipment. Seven percent of the stories considered long-term effects of the war and 6% focused primarily on other issues, including interaction with civilians and humanitarian aid.

This by no means suggests these other topics were left uncovered. Rather, this suggests that embedded reporting was the media's eye on the front line, rather than on the lives of the soldiers.

In 2005, few Americans ever heard of the embedded reporter for the St. Louis Post Dispatch. It was not until he launched a smear campaign against Sergeant Jimmy Massey, a Marine who publicly confessed to killing innocent civilians on the road to Baghdad, thai Harris made a name for himself in the mainstream media, including CNN. Harris attacked Massey for speaking out about the carnage in Iraq. He questioned Massey's motives and the veracity of his story.

When Harris made his accusations, however, he did not realise that Massey's claims about civilian killings were already corroborated by three other Marines with whom he served. Their testimony is recorded on tape by Massey's publisher and a Danish journalist.

The controversy between the pro-war journalist from St. Louis and the outspoken Marine from the Smoky Mountains of North Carolina became contentious on Democracy Now (5/14/2005) when Massey called Harris a mouthpiece for the Marine Corps brass. He criticised Harris for embellishing and romanticising military operations in which Massey himself was involved. As Massey began to quote Harris' story, Harris blurted out: "If that's what the Marine Corps reported, then that's what we reported." We. "Oh, wait a minute," Massey responded. "So you're saying you report what the Marine Corps reports?

Harris covered the war in Iraq for two tours, from Feb. 23 to April 27 in 2003 and April 1st through Sept. 26 in 2004. His 2003 reports in the Post Dispatch, built around briefings from Lt. Gen. James Conway, Lima Company Commanding Officer Capt. George Schaeffer, and Lt. Col. Michael Belcher, portray the invasion as a moral and military triumph. In contrast, Massey, who participated directly in the campaign, describes the unprovoked war as a disaster, a pyrrhic victory.

According to the tall, good-looking Iraqi-war veteran, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not only swift, it was brutal. "We were like a bunch of cowboys who rode into town shooting up the place. I saw charred bodies in vehicles that were clearly not military vehicles. I saw people dead on the side of the road in civilian clothes." "As far as I'm concerned," Massey said in a recent interview, "the real war did not begin until Iraqis saw us murdering innocent civilians. I mean, they were witnessing their loved ones being murdered by U.S. Marines." Massey points out that the occupation actually created enemies who did not exist prior to the invasion. That's the key insight in the Massey story. The indiscriminate destruction, the uncorrected pattern of checkpoint killings, and the callousness of high command generated rage, hatred, and eventually drove Iraqis to resist.

On November 5th, 2005, Ron Harris published a front-page attack on Massey, in which he questioned Massey's claims about civilian casualties. (In his prior articles, Harris claimed that civilian casualties were minimal.)

Now attention turns to Harris, whose own motives and writings invite scrutiny. The controversy concerns not only the trustworthiness of Harris, but the integrity of embedded journalists who are oblivious to US war crimes in Iraq. Massey is a whistle-blower, not only on the military, but on journalists like Harris who have a record of sanitising the horrors of war.

In the New York Review of Books, November 16, 2005, Michael Massing casts light on the issue of what is being reported from Iraq. During the invasion "there remained firm limits on what could be reported out of Iraq. Especially taboo were frank accounts of the actions of US troops in the field particularly when those actions resulted in the deaths of Iraqi civilians." The New York Times, for example, routinely reported civilian deaths caused by insurgents, but rarely mentioned those inflicted by Americans. "US journalists feel queasy about quoting eyewitnesses who offer information that runs counter to statements put out by the US military t The abuses that US troops routinely commit in the field, and their responsibility for the deaths of many thousands of innocent Iraqis, are viewed by the American press as too sensitive for most Americans to see or read about."

Although the Pentagon's media plan got high marks from some quarters, the embedded journalists missed the reality, fundamental natures and the politics of the war.

National Public Radio's Tom Gjelten put it, "We were offered an irresistible opportunity: free transportation to the front line of the war, dramatic pictures, dramatic sounds, great quotes. Who can pass that up?"

Thus the embedded reporters produced some good reports from the front lines. But they missed the most important questions about the fundamental nature of the conflict. Was the Bush administration really pursuing a war to protect Americans from the "threat" posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein? Or were concerns about weapons of mass destruction and terrorist ties (none of which have ever been substantiated) a cover for a war about oil and empire? Administration officials always denied such claims. But should reporters accept that on faith, just because administration officials said it?

Readers and listeners all over the world were exposed to a vigorous discussion of the motivations behind the war, but Americans especially those who got their news from television-were largely deprived of the real picture and motive of the invasion.

The sole reason of such deprivation of the Americans was the intentional presentation of the news of the embedded reporters who moved, ate, slept and passed time with the U S soldiers.

That's why Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said without hesitation as the war was winding down that the embedded system worked "very well."

Army Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount III of the 3rd Infantry Division echoed that assessment: "A level of trust developed between the soldier and the media that offered nearly unlimited access."

So, the embedded reporters missed the principal points of the war which frustrated the people all over the world.

The embedded reporters are able to report live from their positions while receiving input from military personnel on various situations. In many cases, firefights and bombing in Iraq have been shown live on television.

However, they are not immune to injuries or casualties. Several have died, been held in captivity or have been injured while covering the war in Iraq. Recently, Fox News journalist, Greg Kelly, and his cameraman received facial injuries from a mortar round from Iraqi forces that landed near them.

Michael Kelly, editor-at-large for the "Atlantic Monthly," was killed while traveling with the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq. He is the first American journalist to die while covering the war on Iraq.

KCC associate professor of sociology Neghin Modavi pointed out what she saw as both the negative and positive sides of having embedded journalists. "On the negative and critical side, scholars who have studied the phenomenon of embedded journalists during World Wars I and II say that historically, embedded journalist experiments have not worked very well. There's the tendency for reporters to psychologically identify with the troops whom they accompany and share experiences with, and on whom they rely for their safety," she said. "This they say, often results in reduced objectivity on part of the reporter and the practice of self-censorship."

Curt Sanburn, Managing Editor of the Honolulu Weekly, shares Modavi's criticism of embedded journalists. "The news that comes out of embed ded journalist reporting is piecemeal," he said. "It's sort of like you are there, but it is more like reality television."

Catherine Toth, a KCC journalism instructor and Honolulu Advertiser reporter said that she values the role of embedded journalist. "I think having media there with coverage of the military is important," said Toth. "The purpose is to provide information of the war from that particular perspective to an audience at home."

Toth said that she has sympathy for the current embedded journalists working long hours in the Middle East to cover the war in Iraq.

John Windrow, Honolulu Advertiser night city editor, said that the reporting from embedded journalist in this war is good. "I think this coverage is much better than it was in the 1991 war against Iraq," said Windrow. "In the 1991 war, they (the U.S.) kept most of the journalists in Saudi Arabia. What they are doing now is much better." Windrow, a former naval officer in the Vietnam era from 1972-1976, questioned whether or not the military would still allow journalists to be embedded in units if the war started to go badly for coalition forces.

"If the war lasted a long time and starts to go badly, will the press still be given access" he asked. "I think the access (for embedded journalists) will change if the war starts to go badly."

Embedded journalists do have rules they must follow, such as not reporting certain information that would give the enemy sensitive information.

According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, the war coverage is not graphic, despite being dramatic. Not a single story examined showed pictures of people being hit by fired weapon.

Former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested we are getting only "slices" of the war. Other observers have likened the media coverage to seeing the battlefield through "a soda straw." The battle for Iraq is war as we've never seen before. It is the first full-scale American military engagement in the age of the Internet, multiple cable channels and a mixed media culture that has stretched the definition of journalism.

The most noted characteristic of the media coverage so far, however, is the new system of "embedding" some 600 journalists with American and British troops.

What are Americans getting on television from this "embedded" reporting? How close to the action are the "embeds" getting? Who are they talking to? What are they talking about?

To provide some framework for the discussion, the Project for Excellence in Journalism conducted a content analysis of the embedded reports on television during three of the first six days of the war. The Project is affiliated with Columbia University and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

The embedded coverage, the research found, is largely unreliable. It's both exciting and dull, combat focused, and mostly live and unedited. Much of it lacks context but it is usually rich in detail. It has all the virtues and vices of reporting only what you can see.

The results of the embedding experiment will not be known for some time. Bob Steele, from the Poynter Institute, an organisation for journalists, says the access "has allowed reporters and photographers to get closer to understanding (the complexities of war), to tell the stories of fear and competence, to tell the stories of skill and confusion. I think that's healthy."

But, Steele cautioned that while "closeness can breed understanding," journalists must remain objective and not write about "we" or "our," but about "they."

"There's nothing wrong with having respect in our hearts for the men and women who are fighting this war, or respect for the men and women who are marching in the anti-war protests. The key is to make sure those beliefs don't colour reporting," Steele said.

Eric S. Margolis

PRESIDENT Pervez Musharraf's long and painful goodbye finally ended last Monday as he resigned from office, leaving in his wake a Pakistan awash in political uncertainty and rising violence. Pakistanis danced with joy in streets at the fall of Musharraf, who ruled his strife-torn nation of 165 million for nine years. Meanwhile, Washington frantically scrambled to find a replacement for the accommodating Musharraf, its favourite, most cooperative dictator.

I interviewed Musharraf when he first seized power in 1999. I'd known every Pakistani leader since tough, capable General Zia ul-Haq in the mid-1980's.

After the meeting, I said to myself, 'Mush, you're no Zia.' I found Musharraf a rather sour little man with no evident qualities who had come to lead Pakistan almost by accident. He certainly did not seem ready to lead the world's most important Muslim nation.

9/11 turned Musharraf from a nobody into a prime American ally and national dictator. The humiliated Bush administration needed revenge. Though the plot was hatched in Germany and Spain, Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's Afghan base was chosen as the target. But the US first needed to use Pakistan's air bases, supply depots, army and intelligence service to invade and occupy Afghanistan.

Pakistan's then director General of ISI intelligence, Gen. Mahmoud, told me the US threatened to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if Islamabad didn't allow Washington to take command of its military forces and bases, and wage war on Taleban. Musharraf confirmed this threat in his autobiography. The little general gave in with unseemly haste. He quickly rented the Pakistani Army and ISI to the US for $1.1 billion in official annual payments, and billions more in covert CIA payments to top generals, high officials, politicians and journalists. Musharraf ruled as both army chief and Washington's paymaster general in Pakistan. Musharraf sent his soldiers and intelligence agents to fight pro-Taleban Pashtun tribesmen along Pakistan's northwestern frontier, and allowed the US to use Pakistan airbases and supply depots. Without these bases, the US and its NATO allies could not have waged war in Afghanistan. Thousands of Pakistani civilians, most of them Pashtun tribesmen, were killed by Musharraf's armed forces.

The General was feted in Washington and hailed as a 'statesman.' When he first overthrew the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf had some popularity. But over 80 per cent of Pakistanis came to detest Musharraf, branding him a traitor and American agent for selling out his nation's national interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Musharraf was accused of handing over up to 1,000 Pakistanis to CIA, all of whom have vanished. Finally, he was left with almost no support at home save for a few fat cat politicians.

Good riddance, say Pakistanis. Few will mourn Musharraf or his nine-year rule. But what next? The rival leaders of the democratically elected coalition government, People's Party chief Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of the slain Benazir, and Muslim League (N) leader, former PM Nawaz Sharif, are vying to see who will become the next president or prime minister.

Nawaz is better qualified, but Zardari has a bigger following and the mantle of martyred Benazir. Both vow to restore the judiciary purged by Musharraf with US, British and Canadian backing. However, Zardari is dragging his feet, fearing reinstated justices may reopen serious corruption charges that have dogged him for decades. He claims these accusations were all politically inspired. But many Pakistanis see him as deeply corrupt and the wrong person to represent their nation which so badly needs an image improvement.

The powerful military watches from the sidelines. Its dour, highly professional commander, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, has so far stayed out of politics. But now that Musharraf is gone, Washington's Plan B is to push Kiyani into power as a new military dictator though he has given no sign he wants the job.

The White House is desperate for a new strategy in Pakistan. The Bush administration has been so preoccupied by its failing war in Afghanistan, and so busy forcing Musharraf to follow policies hated by his people, that it failed to see Pakistan was turning into a volcano of anti-Western hatred and violence.

Some US conservatives are calling for Pakistan to be branded a 'terrorist state' and its nuclear arsenal destroyed by US forces. Meanwhile, Pakistan's politicians keep squabbling while the nation drifts on a sea of dangers.