The New Nation - Internet Edition

Sinha M. A. Sayeed

There is no denying the fact that the concept of 'Failed State' has meanwhile drawn attention of all as one of the burning issues of the day and the matter has been fueled, fomented and intensified more acutely after the publication of the book 'Failed States: The Abuse of power and the Assault on Democracy' written by the most authoritative American left intellectual Professor Noam Chomsky. In this book, he assertively branded America also as the foremost failed state from the point of view of the immediate past and, in particular, the recent activities of the Bush administration and American domestic and foreign policy. America being the leader of the unipolar world has not only become desperate, undemocratic and dam care externally but, its dealing with its citizens at home in all most all major issues involving a peaceful life and living with maximum benefits of a democratic welfare state has also been marked seriously with a note of interrogation, of course. The same feeling and agony in a different fashion have been demonstrated in the writings of Harvard Professor Robert I. Rotberg and others. Interestingly enough, it is also heard and told in many ways that Bangladesh is either within the ambit of a failed state or it is not far away from it. Therefore, if the concept of a failed state entails both USA and Bangladesh, then the question is, what does the concept 'failed state' imply in true sense of the term?

From the logical, practical and scientific points of view the definition of a failed state is yet to be formulated accommodating properly all the factors which are directly or indirectly responsible for giving birth to such landscapes in the fate of a state. More important is that the geopolitical consequences of such assessment, determination and declaration shall have to be taken into serious consideration. There may be a weak or crisis or collapsible state, but to discover the existence of a failed state must tantamount to an invention only. It is more logical to say that a party or regime or junta that runs a government may fail. And hence, failure of running a government cannot under any equation be equated with the death of a state. One must not be forgetful that government is one of the four pillars of the formation of a state while other three being the territory, population and sovereignty. If one or two elements face the problems of malfunction or dysfunction or even the existence, which can not out rightly be dubbed as the coffin on the dead body of a state in the name of a so-called failed state. Therefore, the concept of failed states may also be viewed as a great misnomer that the world has ever produced, although a number of attempts have been made, and are still being made, to define the concept of failed state and of them the following are in the limelight:

Weber's analysis: Weber's experiment that a state may be said to "succeed" if it maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders and when this is broken (e.g., through the dominant presence of warlords, militias, or terrorism), the very existence of the state becomes dubious, and the state becomes a failed state is also faced with further complexities. The difficulty of determining whether a government maintains "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force" (which includes the problems of the definition of "legitimate") means it is not clear precisely when a state may be said to have "failed." It is categorically asserted by many analysts and researchers that this problem of legitimacy may be solved by understanding what Weber intended by it. They like to adhere to the conclusion that Weber clearly explains that only the state has the means of production necessary for physical violence (politics as vocation). This means that the state does not require legitimacy for achieving monopoly on the means of violence (de facto) but will need one if it needs to use it (de jure).

The term is also used in the sense of a state that has been rendered ineffective (i.e., has nominal military/police control over its territory only in the sense of having no armed opposition groups directly challenging state authority; in short, the "no news is good news" approach) and is not able to enforce its laws uniformly because of high crime rates, extreme political corruption, an extensive informal market, impenetrable bureaucracy, judicial ineffectiveness, military interference in politics, cultural situations in which traditional leaders wield more power than the state over a certain area but do not compete with the state, or a number of other factors.

The Crisis States Research Centre defines a "failed state" as a condition of "state collapse" - e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

This term is used in very contradictory ways in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a "poorly performing" state as "failed" - a tendency the Crisis States Research Centre rejects). The opposite of a "failed state" is an "enduring state" and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organizations, might continue to exist. Other think-tank organizations like Center for Defense Information, Global Policy Forum working in the same line hold, more or less, the similar views about the definitions and interpretations of failed states.

Magazine Foreign Policy: Since 2005, the United States think-tank, the Fund for Peace and the Magazine Foreign Policy, publishes an annual index called the Failed States Index. The list only assesses sovereign states (determined by membership in the United Nations.) Several territories are excluded until their political status and UN membership is ratified in international law. For example: Taiwan, the Palestinian Territories, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, and Western Sahara are not included in the list - even though some are recognized as sovereign states by some nations. Ranking is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators (see below.) For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120, and, accordingly, the failed states are categorized into Alert, Warning, No Information/ Dependent Territory, Moderate and Sustainable based on their proximity to the total sum of the 12 indicators

Indicators of State Vulnerability: The index's ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability - four social, two economic and six political The indicators are not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Instead, they are meant to measure a state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict. Countries are categorized based on red, orange and yellow Zones. All countries in the red, orange, or yellow categories display some features that make parts of their societies and institutions vulnerable to failure. Some in the yellow zone may be failing at a faster rate than those in the more dangerous orange or red zones, and therefore could experience violence sooner. Conversely, some in the red zone, though critical, may exhibit some positive signs of recovery or be deteriorating slowly, giving them time to adopt mitigating strategies.

Social Indicators:

1. Demographic pressures including the pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources.

2. Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples: forced uprooting of large communities because of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance: based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression. Institutionalized political exclusion. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

4. Chronic and sustained human flight: both the "brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of "the middle class." Growth of exile/expiate communities are also used as part of this indicator.

Economic Indicators:

5. Uneven economic development along group lines: determined by group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status. Also measured by group-based poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels.

6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline: measured by a progressive economic decline of the society as a whole (using: per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.

Political Indicators:

7. Criminalization and/or delegitimisation of the state: endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability and political representation. Includes any widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.

8. Progressive deterioration of public services: a disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also using the state apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.

9. Widespread violation of human rights: an emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians. A rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices. Any widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution.)

10. Security apparatus as 'state within a state': an emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. An "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces.

11. Rise of factionalized elites: a fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. Any use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith.

12. Intervention of other states or external factors: military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Magazine Foreign Policy has till the date made four failed states index starting from 2005 to 2008, which mau be summarized as follows:

Failed States Index 2005

2005 was the first year that the Fund for Peace published the list. 76 states were analyzed, of which 33 were classified as "alert" and 43 as "warning" (ratings better than "warning" were not done in this year). Of the worst 20, Bangladesh stands at 17. Failed States Index 2006

146 states were included in the 2006 list, of which 28 were classified as "alert", 78 as "warning", 27 as "moderate" and 13 as "sustainable". Of the worst 20, Bangladesh's position is 19.

Failed States Index 2007

177 states were included in the list, of which 32 were classified as "alert", 97 as "warning", 33 as "moderate" and 15 as "sustainable". Of the worst 20 Bangladesh stands at 16

Failed States Index 2008'

177 states were included in the list, of which 35 were classified as 'alert', 92 as 'warning' 35 as 'moderate', 15 as 'sustainable'. Of the 20 worst states, Bangladesh came down to 12 from 16 in the Failed States Index 2007.

In fact, there is no legal basis of such index of failed states. Neither United Nations nor European Union nor any other international body can legally stand by this. To what extent such inquiries will be useful is still a matter to be seen in practice. Despite all these speculations, one thing need to be taken care of is that there must be some sorts of designs behind such determination, mathematics and declaration. Because an inductive logic believes that nothing comes out of nothing and each and every event is the result of multiple causes, near or remote.

A sense of phobia may be in operation that this device shall be treated as penultimate tools for making such states as more and more hinterland scapegoats for commercial, military and strategical purposes of the aid-giving countries and agencies. Yes, there is a strong current of thought everywhere in the world that the Magazine Foreign Policy is not free from the influence of those who matter in the administration of the United States of America. Therefore, a logical asking haunting the very minds of all is: Is it really possible on the part of Magazine Foreign Policy to turn its attention also to the hyper state United States of America?

[The writer is Executive Director, Bangladesh Institute of Leadership and Security Studies and former International, Publicity and Publications Secretary of Jatio Party)