The New Nation - Internet Edition

Nasim Zehra

While the Long March in Pakistan demanding restoration of judges did underscore public support for the cause of the restoration of the judiciary, the inconclusive manner in which it ended does not bode well for how the non-lawyer community would respond to another Long March call.

The lawyer community will now have to explore its 'movement toolkit' to identify its onward and credible path. Continued dialogue with the parliamentary forces remains indispensable for the judiciary's restoration. Meanwhile the pre- and post-Long March posturing, moves and statements of various political parties are significant. It raises numerous questions about the future trends in Pakistani politics. Eight are noteworthy.

One, what did the Long March signify? It was a reiteration of the spirit of 2007 which mobilised people through most of the Long March route to either support it or actively participate in it. The numerical success of the Long March was also a manifestation of the growing post March-9 phenomenon, the new non-partisan popular political power which cuts across political, ideological and class divide and seeks the exercise of Executive, government and State power within the parameters laid down in the Constitution.

Two, should the PML-N supporters and leadership have participated in the Long March? The opinion within the PML-N was divided. Given PML-N's commitment to the restoration and also Nawaz Sharif's commitment to keep the coalition intact, it was a tough call. The PML-N's political support and its workers participation was a must.

However, it was Nawaz Sharif's address not his presence at the Long March, in Lahore that indicated perhaps a separation, even though only issue-based, from the ruling coalition. His own contribution to the coalition's cause however was that he contributed towards preventing a sit-in by the participants. Press reports in fact hold him squarely responsible for unpopular no sit-in decision - a fact that PPP should be grateful for!

Three, what was the PPP leader's political response to the Long March? Asif Zardari's response came in his Governor House speech in Lahore. He sought to claim monopoly of the PPP on the leadership role in Pakistan's original democratic struggle, on the sacrifices for democracy, on the ability to steer Pakistan back to genuine democracy, on the ability to organise a genuine Long March and on the capability to successfully fight a military dictator now as it did in the past.

In Zardari's Governor House speech, there was no mention of his coalition partners. The 'reconciliation man' who hardly talks of democracy without mentioning the centrality of the PML-N partnership to strengthening the democratic system, now resentful, was responding to PML-N's participation in the Long March. A visibly agitated Zardari announced that very soon the PPP would place a PPP president, another Salman Taseer in the President House. Four, what were the objectives and role of un-elected political forces? The un-elected political forces have aligned themselves with the restoration movement because they must believe in the cause. Yet, barring Nawaz Sharif, most have limited electoral support and they have their own political agendas and their political strategies, ranging from threatening the elected government with deadlines and ouster.

The organisers must ask themselves if allowing the politicians to address the Long March was a politically correct move. While the presence of these leaders was necessary, their making speeches meant that the Long march was being used to promote different and even contradictory political agendas by non-elected groups.

Five, can Pakistan's political temperature be reduced without the restoration of the judiciary? No. The restoration issue is one that requires resolution because this is one that has captured the imagination of hundreds of thousands willing to occupy public space.

Also the moral and constitutional legitimacy of the demand too requires an early resolution of the issue. The best way forward now would be to de-link the restoration from the constitutional package and restore, all the judges while retaining the existing judges as ad hoc or regular. A perfect solution is impossible but a less than perfect too will be a major achievement for Pakistan's society and politics.

Six, how should general Pervez Musharraf exit? The disputed and constitutionally controversial president's exit will contribute to lessening the country's political temperature. For that to happen the two routes include the voluntary route meaning his resignation. Second is the constitutional route i.e. impeachment.

The mammoth crowd at the Long March, led by the political leaders who said Musharraf must not get safe exit chanted "hanging, hanging, hanging." Such an eventuality is most unlikely and not what this country needs. Musharraf's voluntary exit is the best option for him and the country that remains plagued by immense turmoil.

Seven, for the Lal Masjid issue, which still warrants a closure, what is the judicious way to settle it? This question becomes relevant given that virtually every speaker during the Long March demanded justice for the victims and punishment for those who conducted the operation. The dreadful end to the Lal Masjid saga has left people pained but the way forward is not to use this as a political tool against opponents. It instead requires a genuine and fair hearing of the Lal Masjid case by a credible judiciary so that the excesses and the causes of excesses by all sides can be identified and rectified for the future.

Eight, what is the way forward on the Kargil issue? Much political footballing around Kargil has been going one. Seeking cheap political gains over a serious issue is merely self-serving. As a national service, a serious impartial inquiry can be instituted. Kargil manifested the poverty of the skewed functioning of state institutions juxtaposed with the weakness of the functioning of the government. It was a blunder on many fronts and those responsible must be identified.

These multiple issues notwithstanding, the real question that trumps all is the future of the ruling coalition. The demands of judicious politics are that the coalition stays intact and that the element of trust between the coalition partners is strengthened. 'Going it alone' for both parties is of course possible.

However, a likely fallout of separation will mean politics of confrontation and the dissipation of political energy in political battling. This would weaken, not strengthen, the parliamentary system and mark the return of politics of vendetta, further weakening state institutions. The cumulative and the gravest impact of confrontational politics will be that the ruling coalition will render itself incapable of solving the acute problems that this ruling coalition has inherited. The crisis facing our state, society and politics will augment, not diminish.

(Nasim Zehra is a political and security analyst based in Islamabad)