The New Nation - Internet Edition

A culture of peace

Hans Koechler

The requirements of a "culture of peace" do not go along with the facts and necessities of a unipolar order of society, whether national, international or even global. A culture of peace - which is the basis of any stable social order - can only flourish in a multipolar environment. The present global realities - in terms of politics as well as culture - are definitely not conducive to the realization of such an ideal. The process of "globalization" has brought about a trend towards cultural uniformity, with the West trying to impose its life-style and system of values almost everywhere; accordingly, the only (remaining) global superpower has set out to "reshape" all regions of the globe on the basis of its own ideology or, more precisely, interests (e.g. the blueprint for a so-called "New Middle East").

The obstacles to durable peace - within and between states as well as socio-cultural groupings - are manifold. They are particularly manifest in the increasing alienation and related tensions between the "West" (i.e. Western countries and cultural groupings) and Islam (i.e. Muslim countries and communities all over the world) and can be identified, inter alia, in the remnants of Eurocentrism, dating back to the colonial era of the 19th and early 20th centuries, which are particularly obvious - and have become especially virulent - in today's globalization drive; in the "cultivation" of anti-Islamic stereotypes in the Western world before and after the events of September 11, 2001; and more specifically in the concerted efforts at redefining the basic tenets of Islam on the basis of the value system of Western secularized society or, under specific circumstances, according to the dogmatic teachings of another religion (namely Christianity). The latter strategy is indeed one of "reinventing" an entire civilization (in particular that of Islam) by measuring it according to the requirements of another religion or perception of the world and the distinct value system related to it - an approach that has been all too obvious in the Regensburg speech of Benedict XVI on Sept. 12, 2006. The underlying attitude of "ideological coercion," i. e. of forced reinterpretation of an entire religion, affects the very integrity of the Muslim faith - and its related civilization and value system - and is in no way whatsoever compatible with the principles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Therefore, the Roman-Catholic Church ought to seriously reconsider its overall approach towards Islam which, if defined within the parameters of the Regensburg speech, is simply incompatible with the principles of dialogue and mutual respect.

The situation has been made even more difficult by the instrumentalization of the so-called "global war on terror" for the advancement of a worldwide anti-Islamic agenda. The international developments triggered by wars that are being conducted in the name of (Western) "civilization," of "secular" values and "human rights" which, in their Western version, are ex cathedra declared as universal (whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, or other Muslim countries), are threatening the peaceful living together of communities not only in the Middle East, but in many other regions of the globe, including Europe. This modern "crusade" has profoundly destabilized the social order at the domestic and regional levels and it threatens to destabilize the complex web of interaction within, and equilibrium of, modern multicultural societies.

As citizens who are concerned about the course of world affairs and aware of the impact this chain of events may have on our respective domestic communities we have to ask one basic question: What are - against the backdrop of these frightening developments that put in jeopardy the fragile system of co-existence established under the aegis of the United Nations Organization since World War II - the philosophical foundations of an order of peace among nations as well as among socio-cultural communities and civilizations? These principles have been specifically and explicitly enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

One of the paramount norms that comes to mind, in this context, is that of tolerance based on the principle of mutuality. As demonstrated in different systems of practical philosophy, in particular that of Immanuel Kant (as far as the European tradition is concerned), claiming the right to one's self-realization - i.e. to living according to one's own world view and value system - implies granting that very right to the "other": i.e. another ethnic, cultural or religious community that lives within the same polity.

Mutual recognition of rights is indeed the very essence of peaceful co-existence, domestically as well as internationally. This principle seems rather obvious, it can indeed be considered a rule of common sense, but it is not easy to abide by it and implement it effectively. In view of the multicultural realities of today's world - entailing complex interdependencies at the domestic and global levels -, there is no other workable solution if permanent confrontation is to be avoided. The polities in many regions, not least of them the European Union, have still to discover the proper approach towards the now global phenomenon of diversity.

It is to be noted that as much as mutual recognition is indispensable for the preservation of peace, it does not require the respective community to give up its religious, ethnic, or - in the most general sense - civilizational identity. To the contrary: such mutual appreciation enriches each community's (and individual's within a given community) self-comprehension and identity and strengthens its role as a partner in a given society - whether domestic, regional, or global.

In our era of globalization - or "globality," as claimed by some - the different levels cannot be disentangled from each other.

In this context, we have to be aware of the dangers of antagonistic paradigms - such as that of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" - which are being advanced in a highly fragile (or insecure) global constellation such as the present one in which the dynamics of globalization, in tandem with the absence of a balance of power (i.e. under the conditions of political and military unipolarity), has brought about an unprecedented identity crisis which affects many communities, including even communities within the predominant "Western" civilization.

One of the biggest, and most real, dangers at the same time is that of Huntington's paradigm becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, eventually entangling diverse, and potentially competing, civilizations with different social perceptions and value systems in an endless cycle of misunderstandings, claims and counter-claims.

What is required - in philosophical terms - is a novel outlook at international relations that is based on what we have earlier called the "hermeneutics of civilizational dialogue" - an approach that recognizes the "other" civilization as conditio sine qua non for a mature understanding of one's own civilization; such an approach understands interaction between civilizations as essential part of the formation of a community's identity.

The principles of this kind of hermeneutics have been laid out, inter alia, in Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Truth and Method" (Wahrheit und Methode).* This philosopher's method makes it possible to define the cultural (or civilizational) identity (awareness of the specificity of one's culture) in relation to the "overlapping" - if not "fusion" - of horizons of different civilizational perceptions of the world.

A basic normative implication of this hermeneutical approach is the maxim of non-interference in each other's civilizational, and thus communal, affairs - at the doctrinal as well as the practical level: such attitude of "abstention" is the fundamental norm underlying a culture of peace, indeed one of the preconditions of inter-communal harmony and co-operation.

Co-existence among religions and civilizations, as they are incorporated in, or represented by, specific cultural communities in a given polity, cannot be envisaged and, thus, must not be propagated in a hierarchical framework in which one civilizational identity is superimposed upon the other and one civilization is measured according to the standards of another.

Furthermore, co-existence alongside each other does not mean, or imply, forced co-operation in areas (such as that of dogmatic teachings) where each community has to preserve its own identity, i.e. where the integrity of a community's very faith or civilizational mission is at stake.

Such forced co-operation could seriously jeopardize existing modes of interaction between religious communities also in other fields and it would definitely undermine the spirit of civil co-operation, oriented towards the bonum commune, at the domestic level. Good neighborliness cannot be built on a forced "change of identity" - contrary to what some in Europe believe, who tend to impose a so-called "lead culture" (Leitkultur) upon all cultural groups and communities, and contrary to what the propagators of a "reinvented" Islam (namely one redefined according to non-Islamic, Western values) want to make us believe.

Genuine dialogue comes never at the expense of the partner's moral and civilizational integrity and, thus, identity. Mankind has to learn the lessons of history in that regard.

The traumatic experience of the medieval crusades must not be repeated under the circumstances of today's global unipolarity (as tempting as this may appear to the beneficiaries of the present global imbalance). In actual fact, these strategies have almost always led to major upheavals and to protracted civil and eventually regional wars.

Malaysian general elections: What now?

Tengku Ahmad Hazri

On 5 April 2008, the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), organised an in-house forum on 'The 12th Malaysian General Elections: What Now?'. It was the fourth in the JUST In-House Forum series - the first was on 'Religious State or Secular State: What is the Future?', followed by 'State and Religion: Case of Turkey' and the third was on 'Alternatives to Empire'. The forum series began last year and is held on a bi-monthly basis at the JUST office in Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia. This time, the speakers were legal scholar, Professor Shad Saleem Faruqi who is also a JUST Executive Committee member, and JUST President, political scientist, Professor Chandra Muzaffar. The session was moderated by the Vice-President of JUST, Professor Abdullah al-Ahsan. Professor Shad first explored the legal and constitutional issues that arose from the election while Professor Chandra then tackled the political themes behind it. Here, however, Chandra's presentation will be highlighted first in order for the legal and constitutional issues to be put into context.

The outcome of the recent Malaysian General Election unleashed unprecedented challenges that will critically determine the course of Malaysian politics in the years to come. The closest historical parallel to the recent election that could be found in 1969 Election. Much like the present, in 1969, the Alliance was in a precarious condition in five states - Penang, Kedah, Kelantan, Selangor and Perak. The Alliance lost Penang to the Opposition (Gerakan, was then in the Opposition); retained Kedah but only with a slim majority; failed to recapture Kelantan; had only a two-seat majority in Perak; and was 'deadlocked' in Selangor. But there the similarities end.

Despite the May 13 communal riots that ensued from the 1969 election, a strong leadership emerged with a clear sense of direction. The National Operations Council was set up to deal with the riots; and the National Consultative Council was formed, the legacy of which - such as the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Rukunegara - has endured to this very day. There was a leadership change no doubt, as Tun Abdul Razak succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as the Prime Minister and leader of UMNO and the Alliance. But the party members were united behind him. Indeed, when a constitutional amendment was proposed in 1971, even the major opposition parties (barring the DAP), PAS and Gerakan, lent their endorsement. It was the only moment in Malaysian history when the ruling coalition had to rely on opposition votes to effectuate a constitutional amendment. Shortly afterwards, PAS, Gerakan and the Perak-based Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) even joined the Alliance in an expanded coalition called the Barisan Nasional (BN).

But today, things are not quite the same, and Chandra did not hesitate to argue that Malaysia is in fact moving into "unchartered territory." There are no doubt positive developments that can be discerned from the recent election. He noted, in particular, how this election had witnessed the greatest empowerment of voters. The sentiment that the voters have power and significance to bring about change in the country has gained momentum and become widespread. The BN, for long assured of its legitimacy and credentials in the eyes of the electorate, had at last been jolted. Decades of tenure in power that is fertile breeding ground for complacency, arrogance and abuse of power has now been challenged with the rise of a new political force to be reckoned with. On the other side of the game, PAS and the DAP, two parties that have always been each other's "other" and came together only once in an informal political pact in the 1999 General Election, are now compelled to co-operate at the state level in Perak and Selangor. Beyond these, however, the political climate remains riddled with uncertainties and the road ahead fraught with ambiguities. This sense of ambivalence is especially pronounced within UMNO, the dominant party in the ruling BN coalition, which is severely affected by the election outcome.

With the largest number of seats in Parliament (78), UMNO of course, remains the most powerful political party in the country and is easily the strongest Malay party around. This notwithstanding, the internal rift within the party is equally noteworthy: sieged from within and without, what UMNO is undergoing presently is nothing less than a "crisis of confidence." Faith in the leadership has dwindled and the overall sense of collective unity within the party is showing signs of erosion. Long before the election, former UMNO President Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was already launching his ferocious attacks against Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi. And right after the election, Datuk Mukhriz Mahathir asked Abdullah to step down. To a question by a forum participant on the significance of Datuk Seri Hishamuddin Hussein's decision to quit as UMNO Youth Chief, Chandra considered the possibility that Hishamuddin was perhaps allowing forces against Khairy Jamaluddin to gather support and this could impact upon Abdullah Badawi, especially in the state of Johor where the grassroot movement against him is quite strong.

While the legal imperative may work in his favour (he still commands the support of the majority of parliamentarians), moral responsibility dictates that Abdullah Badawi should have stepped down on the night of the verdict. Yet, he is holding on tenaciously to power. And this could have immense repercussions upon the other component parties of the BN.

Reforms within the BN parties is probably long overdue, yet if UMNO, as the backbone of the coalition, fails to regain credibility, MCA and MIC in particular will have a hard time ahead. In Sabah and Sarawak, the BN performed remarkably well. This could, nonetheless, hint at a new direction in Malaysian politics, for, having lost its forte in the Peninsula, BN's victory appears to be secured thanks to the loyalty of the East Malaysian voters. Emboldened by their new-found significance in the coalition, Sabah and Sarawak may press for more concessions from the BN-led Federal Government. Sabah's track record as the state with the largest number of party crossovers would have been reason enough for the Centre to think twice before declining their requests. And yet, Chandra noted, Abdullah Badawi had indicated that it is not possible to accommodate all their demands. In Sarawak at least, fears of MP crossovers are placated by the fact that the leadership under Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud has in the past been able to keep party unity relatively intact. This, in spite of the diversity of the parties that make up the BN coalition in Sarawak - PPB, SUPP, PRS and SPDP.

PKR. As the BN is entangled in this web of crises and calamities, it is not difficult to fathom who the beneficiaries would be. In his analysis of the state of the Opposition post-election, Chandra observed how the PKR has emerged as the largest party in the Pakatan Rakyat with 31 seats in Parliament. Its ability to penetrate into and win in 'mixed constituencies' (those with 35%-65% Malay voters), for long under BN's influence, is unprecedented. Interestingly, this was accomplished more with the support of the Chinese and Indian votes than with the Malay votes. 'Swing votes' were highest among the Indians (35%), followed by the Chinese (30%) and Malays (5%). Although BN retains most of the seats in mixed constituencies, its fortress there had been seriously undermined.

Ahead of the PKR however, lie challenges that will determine its ability to garner more than 'protest votes' from the people generally. Ideological cohesion, to begin with, seems to be lacking in PKR, with liberal democrats, socialists and Islamic advocates, fighting under the same banner. More importantly, the more sensitive issues of ethnicity and religion will continue to be the factor that will either unite or divide the party members. The issue of an Islamic state, for instance, has been a bone of contention among the different groups within the PKR, with some voicing support for this agenda advanced explicitly by PAS only to be met with vigorous opposition from within the same party.

DAP. The recent election witnessed the DAP's best performance in history. With 28 seats in Parliament, the closest it ever came to this figure was way back in 1986 with 24 seats. This massive support was no doubt fuelled greatly by the 'swing votes' of Chinese and Indian voters. DAP's entry into this spotlight had also compelled it to come to terms with the realities of Malaysian politics, as testified for example, by its initial objection to a PAS candidacy for the post of Perak Menteri Besar, only to subdue its protest later and acquiesce with the collective decision. "It's not just the state constitution," Chandra observed. "it is a question of the realities that have shaped this nationtthat this nation had emerged from a Malay polity." The state constitutional requirement for a Malay Menteri Besar cannot be changed through the ballot box, but has to evolve through time.

In Penang, the DAP-led government has made some "commendable" moves, such as the declaration of assets, cutting down on wastage and implementation of the open tender system.

PAS. PAS was the biggest beneficiary of Malay disillusionment with UMNO. Although it secured only 23 seats in Parliament (in 1999 it won 27 seats), for the first time in history, PAS made major inroads into the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia, winning many seats in Perak and Selangor and even managing to capture the West Coast state of Kedah. This is in addition to its traditional support-base of Kelantan. In this election, PAS established itself as a political party with "urban, middle-class, Malay, Muslim support."

But what is equally important is that PAS had also become increasingly conscious of Malaysia's multi-religious character, as signalled by its exclusion of the Islamic State agenda as a concession to the Pakatan Rakyat.

Pakatan Rakyat. The Pakatan Rakyat (PR) - PAS-PKR-DAP coalition - is in need of a common ideology to unite them within a shared political framework that will also facilitate power-sharing. At the same time, some of the greatest hurdles that lie ahead of it have to do more with the "nitty-gritty" of politics such as very concrete and tangible issues pertaining to ethnicity and religion.

Outside the ethno-religious parameters , issues that have to be addressed by all include the fate of the Malaysian underclass, corruption, crime and foreign policy.

Shad Saleem Faruqi, in his presentation on the constitutional and legal implications of the recent election, explained how constitutional issues are invariably linked to matters of political importance. This is seen in how many practices are observed as matters of political conventions, which, though not legally binding, are nonetheless the "flesh that clothes the dry bones of the law" and have been adhered to as if they were legal provisions. With this observation as the backdrop, Shad highlighted some of the crucial issues that have come to the fore during the election.

Ethnicity and the State Governments: The situation in Perak has raised the question whether a non-Malay can ever assume the post of Menteri Besar. The legal position is that in all nine Malay states the MB must be a Malay-Muslim but the Sultan has a residual discretion to waive this if it is expedient to do so.

The role of monarchy: Royal intervention in politics particularly in Perak, Perlis and Terengganu has brought to the fore the question of the role of the monarchy in Malaysian society. In Perak, although the BN has the largest number of seats, the loose opposition coalition commands the majority support. In this situation, Shad maintained that the Sultan rightly gave the opposition the first bite of the cherry, and if they had not succeeded in forming the government the BN could have set up a minority government.

In Perlis, the "letter of appointment" as the Menteri Besar issued by the Prime Minister was clearly unconstitutional as a federal Prime Minister cannot take over the functions of the State Ruler or Governor whose conditional discretion in the matter of appointment is mentioned in Article 39(2) of the Perlis Constitution.

In Terengganu, there was a clear-cut majority and a leader who commanded the support of the legislature. Thus there was no reason why the Istana ( the palace) should intervene in the appointment of the Menteri Besar.

Loss of 2/3 Majority: The loss of BN's 2/3 majority in Parliament has little effect on its law-making power or the annual budget as these require merely a simple majority of those attending the Parliamentary session. Constitutional amendments however, would pose a problem for the ruling coalition.

Special Position of the Malays: Article 153 of the Federal Constitution which secures the Special Position of the Malays and other Bumiputeras is very well-protected and requires no less than a constitutional amendment, the support of 2/3 majority of the total membership of Parliament and the consent of the Council of Rulers to be changed.

Early Dissolution of Parliament: Despite the right to stay in power for another year, the Prime Minister called for an early dissolution of Parliament and election, authorised under Article 55 (3) of the Federal Constitution. Shad noted how manifestly unfair this is, allowing one of the 'combatants' to choose the timing of the battle and contrasted it with the US Presidential Election where the election date is constitutionally fixed on the second Saturday of November every four years. However the PM's power is simply advisory and the Yang DiPertuan Agong may refuse to dissolve Parliament if he so wished under Article 40(2)(b), although by convention, he does not.

The forum participants, during the Q&A session, were concerned about the legal position of possible political moves that might take place in the near future. On the probability of a state of emergency being declared, Shad argued that although the PM may advise the Yang DiPertuan Agong to declare a state of emergency, dissolve state assemblies and thereby bring them under Federal control, the YDPA may refuse to do so.

If the forum could in any way be seen as a microcosmic representation of the general public sentiment, there was an overall optimism about the electoral verdict. Despite the divergent views and opinions, on one thing there was agreement: that the election marks a turning point in Malaysian politics. If the BN manages to revitalise itself and the PR maintain their solidarity and cohesion, Malaysia could move towards a two-party system made up of inter-party coalitions.

A new politics of pragmatism is underway as political parties that were once outside government make their way into the corridors of power. On the side of the electorate, there is a feeling that the voters have become more assertive and more independent. Perhaps a more pluralistic approach to politics is beginning to emerge.

Australia's future in the region and the world

Michális S. Michael

The post-Cold War period has seen important changes in the global organisation of human affairs, not least in Australia's own Asia-Pacific region. However, despite a profusion of economic transactions and significant cultural exchanges, the Asia-Pacific faces complex and difficult problems: civil conflicts, geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainties, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and flashpoints that may lead to war.

There is no doubt that in an increasingly contracting world Australia's future lies within a secure, prosperous, peaceful, stable and environmentally sustainable region. However, Australia's historical and geographical exceptionalism has often coloured its political outlook on the world: a certain insularity characteristic of island nations, a profound sense of dependence on American power, a deeply entrenched incapacity to acknowledge the darker side of its recent history, a habitual Anglo-centric dominated perspective, all of which have severely impeded a coherent sense of national identity and prompted a marked ambivalence towards Asia. It is only within this context that we can make sense of Australia's troubled relationship with Asia, and begin to identify the anxieties and insecurities that continue to shape Australia's image of itself and its place in the world.

After a decade where Australia's conception of the world was formulated through western, and in particular American, notions of cultural and political superiority, a new government that re-embraces multilateralism and reengages with the region, offers a unique opportunity to set a new and comprehensive agenda for change. In this context, the key question for Australia over the next decade is whether, as a significant regional power, it can contribute, individually and/or collectively, to a more effective system of regional and global security and cooperation? By linking with other allied states (South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, Japan) Australia could, in concert with ASEAN, play a creative role in advancing peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms and processes in the region. Working together at the United Nations and at a regional level, Australia could help avert the looming arms race in East Asia. For this to occur Australia needs to rediscover and reinvent its middle power identity so as to enable it to address more effectively issues of poverty, governance failure and aid delivery - not least in the South Pacific where weak states are increasingly becoming failed states.

However, to build a new regionalism in Asia Pacific requires the reinvigoration and retooling of the existing architecture. Such efforts will need to take account of a rapidly changing global landscape, notably a shift to an increasingly multipolar world. The existing regional architecture needs to be given a more solid normative foundation, a stronger institutional base, and a more coherent set of functions by acknowledging the notion of comprehensive security; incorporating the principles of human security and democratic peace.

Although a new regional architecture cannot countenance conditions of hegemonic control from either the United States or China, the search for alternative pathways to regional stability and prosperity must involve a range of actors across the political and societal spectrum. We are used to thinking of states as having primary responsibility for world order and international relations. However, if we look at world politics in the post Cold War period we see a different logic at work. Whilst governments often steer a state-centric security agenda, regional and global security depends on increasing economic interdependence, thus underscoring the important role the market can play in security-building. However in addition to the state and the market, civil society - organisations that do not come under the jurisdiction of the state, and are not working for profit in the marketplace - at the national, regional and international levels are forging new relationships, linking states and nations in re-imagining and reshaping the future. What is distinctive about these agencies is that they influence and are influenced by the state. They occupy a public space which functions side by side with, yet independently of, the state and the market. It is in this context that Australia's myriad ethnic communities and its own diaspora can be utilised by providing knowledge and access in their original homelands that furthers not only Australia's economic and security interests, but also contributes to regional and international peacebuilding.

Nevertheless, the many challenges facing the state, markets and civil society in Australia, require more imaginative policy options open to them in relation to three key signposts: relations with the United States, reform of the UN system, and cooperative regionalism. In response to the post-Cold War realities of a multipolar world, it is timely for Australia to undertake a careful re-examination of the alliance with the United States. This would enable Australia to develop a more independent security policy, to better reflect its goals and aspirations, while at the same time contributing to global and regional security.

To summarise, in the post-September 11 world we are slowly but steadily moving towards multipolarity as the hegemon's authority declines. The UN is at a pivotal point in its existence and middle powers like Australia will no doubt help to shape its future. China's star is rising and this region has to contend with all the ramifications of this complex reality. Human security is a concept whose time is approaching, certainly one that warrants close and sustained attention. It offers the international community a broader philosophical and political purpose and gives added ballast to the emerging regional and global multilateralism that is a feature of the post-Cold War period. It poses perhaps the most intriguing and critical question of the moment: can civil society (including Australia's multiethnic/multicultural communities), operating across cultural and civilisational boundaries, play a more influential role in defining the goals and processes of regional and international cooperation?