The New Nation - Internet Edition

Praful Bidwai

Nothing seems to be going right for the Indian National Congress, which has recently suffered election reverses in 11 states, including Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal and Uttarakhand. Now, the Bharatiya Janata Party has defeated it in the Karnataka Assembly elections to rule a Southern state for the first time.

The Karnataka outcome is a huge morale-booster for Hindutva, and a source of despondency for the Congress.

It's a significant setback for secularism. But ironically, it's unlikely, as explained below, to produce a BJP breakthrough in other Southern states. Yet, it highlights the Congress's decline and leadership crisis, and should jolt it into radical course correction.

The BJP won 110 out of the Assembly's 224 seats not because people believed it would govern better, but because it ran a focused campaign and got its caste/social group arithmetic basically right. This was centred on the Lingayats in the North and diverse upper-caste groups on the Southern coast.

Besides consolidating this base, the BJP gained in central Karnataka. In Bangalore, it won 17 of 28 seats because successive Congress-led governments have messed up the city.

The BJP presented itself as a united and cohesive organisation, with a clearly identified leader (BS Yeddyurappa). He got sympathy because he had been unfairly dumped by the small Janata Dal (Secular) from a power-sharing arrangement.

The Congress's campaign was lacklustre, and failed to project a leader from among many contenders with clashing identities. The JD (S) couldn't overcome the stigma of rank opportunism and venality, and lost more than half its seats. The Congress was on the defensive because of rising prices, in addition to the agrarian crisis and unemployment. The BJP cynically exploited the Jaipur bombings in Karnataka's communally charged atmosphere.

The BJP also gained from divisions in the secular vote in a three-way contest. Its aggregate vote (33.9 per cent) is lower than the Congress's 34.6. But it won 30 more seats-because its vote is concentrated; the Congress's is evenly spread.

However, one must not underrate the BJP's great gains from its strategy of communally polarising Karnataka-by laying a Hindu claim to the syncretic-Sufi Baba Budangiri shrine in Chikmagalur, fomenting violence in Mangalore, Belgaum and Hubli, drumming up hysteria on false allegations of cow slaughter, and resort to hate-speech and -crime, well-documented by the Karnataka Communal Harmony Forum.

It's no accident that Narendra Modi was the BJP's star campaigner. Communalism has been crucial to the BJP's dramatic growth in Karnataka, from 4 per cent of the vote and 4 Assembly seats in 1989, to 28 per cent and 79 seats in 2004. The Congress has never fought the BJP's communalism, or questioned its lack of pluralism and inclusiveness. However, the BJP's win in Karnataka is unlikely to open the road to power in Andhra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The politics of these states is dominated by two parties/coalitions.

Karnataka is the only Southern state where the main non-Congress political space was occupied by the Right-wing Congress (O) in the late 1960s, and later, the Janata Party. In the other states, that space was taken by secular regional parties-DMK, AIADMK, Telugu Desam, etc-and in Kerala, by the Left.

The Janata legacy facilitated the BJP's entry into Karnataka. This can't happen in the other Southern States. The Karnataka victory may be a one-off affair.

Indeed, as Election Commission data shows, the peculiar distribution of the BJP's vote in Karnataka will work against it in the national elections.

If all the Assembly segments vote in the next Lok Sabha elections exactly as they did now, the BJP would win only 10 of Karnataka's 28 seats, down from 18. The Congress would soar from 8 to 14. This won't be a breakthrough even in Karnataka, leave alone the South.

The Karnataka election's true significance lies in the grim message it carries for the Congress: it may face the prospect of a rout in the next Lok Sabha election unless it urgently takes thorough-going, comprehensive and radical-as distinct from piecemeal, cosmetic and half-hearted-measures to reform itself.

The Congress faces three crucially important crises. First, there's a crisis of political strategy. This is the party's inability to garner mass support and run an efficient electoral machine while articulating a vision for society.

The Congress no longer works at the grassroots. It doesn't quite know what are its social constituencies, and what message it should give them. Nor does it know how to demolish the opposition case against it. It's not good enough to have a few clever spokespersons who turn and twist words. The Congress needs leaders and cadres who speak with conviction.

Finally, there's the leadership crisis. The Congress cannot countenance a democratically- elected leadership independent of the Nehru-Gandhi family. But it lacks the courage to call this leadership to account when it loses.

The Congress still prevents the emergence of autonomous regional leaders. It doesn't project its leaders except in a dynastic mould, without subjecting them to a results-based credibility test.

Unless the Congress boldly and honestly confronts these crises, it cannot resolve them. Ultimately, the corrective measures it takes must be related to policies and programmes. The Congress should know: it's not enough to pass the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. It has to be accompanied by mobilisation of the state and party machineries, and a high-powered public awareness campaign. This alone can prevent large-scale corruption and the scheme's sabotage.