The New Nation - Internet Edition

Talip Küçükcan

Freedom of religion and worship is one of the fundamental human rights that everyone should enjoy regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality and religious preference. The right to believe in a particular religion and practice its rituals are recognised is by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. The 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Tolerance and Non-Discrimination and 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam also underline the significance of freedom of religion for a plural world and urge states and societies to respect and protect these basic rights.

Given the universal status of freedom of religion and freedom of worship, how can we make sense of what is happening in Turkey where wearing a headscarf is banned in universities and a number of attacks took place targeting non-Muslims? Turkey has a unique character when compared to other states with a majority Muslim population. First, it is a secular state and religion is not a source of legislation. Second, Turkey has a democracy which was nurtured for decades despite military interventions and there is a strong will to protect and strengthen the rule of law in the country. Turkey succeeded in establishing a political culture that facilitated the co-existence of a secular state, democracy and religion in society.

Since the mid-1980s Turkey has been moving forward with some ups-and-downs with regards to the provision and protection of civil liberties. Recent developments and current political will strongly indicate that there would be no U-turn in terms of democratisation, balancing civil-military relations and improving human rights, including freedom of religion, in Turkey. A free market economy, liberal policies, access to education, the rise of the new middle class and globalisation have all led to many changes in Turkish society, including a reform in the culture of political governance. Therefore, questions around freedom of religion and restrictions on particular religious activities and practices in Turkey should be discussed in a broader context rather than in the context of unfortunate attacks on priests in Trabzon and Malatya.

Questions about freedom of religion are related to the interpretation and application of secularism and secular policies in Turkey. It should be underlined that the way secularism is interpreted and applied by the state elite in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic has been more restrictive than many European countries. One can argue that Turkey pursued a much stricter secularisation project than even that of France, which is known as one of the most secular states in Europe. As a result of such a secularisation process that is imposed from above in the name modernisation and westernisation, the state in Turkey followed a policy of restriction on religion, as the ban on headscarves illustrates well.

Expression of religion and religiosity is not allowed in the public sphere in Turkey because it is interpreted and defined as a domain of the state rather than that of various social, political and religious actors who to make legitimate claims. Hard line secularists conceive religion and religious groups as a threat to the fundamental principles of the secular state. In the name of protecting secularism against the "imagined enemies", the public domain is strictly closed to religion. Such an attitude has been inculcated in schools and public institutions since the establishment of the Republic. In a sense, a phobia has emerged as far as religion-state relations in Turkish society are concerned, mostly garnered by the elite.

In recent years however, there have been positive changes stimulated by Turkey's EU membership voyage and the country's integration into the regional and global international community. Overall, "Turkish Islam" or the religiosity as developed in Turkey does not lead to radical and extremists demands. Those who would like to have a state based on religious laws are only a fraction of society. The overwhelming majority of the public supports the separation of state and religion and would like to see the strengthening of democracy in the country. There are many reasons to be optimistic that Turkey would do more to lift any restrictions on religious liberty. In this attempt, Europe should be on Turkey's side by integrating the country into the EU. Leaving Turkey out, would only serve the interests of those who resist expansion of civil liberties in the country.

As pointed out earlier, one needs to look at the past as well as the current context to make any assessment of freedom of religion and its enemies in Turkey. Many put the blame for these attacks on a new ultra nationalism that is said to be emerging in Turkey. We need to make a conceptual clarification as far as nationalism in concerned. The concept of nationalism has many negative associations in Europe such as racism, discrimination and more dramatically ethnic cleansing which was witnessed in the 1990s. As for Turkey, broadly speaking, there are two types of nationalism. One of them can be described as "patriotism", which does not carry any negative feelings or hatred towards "others" on the basis of religious, ethnic and linguistic differences. To some degree, Islam is also part of such patriotism because a saying of Prophet Muhammad (p) is frequently cited to support such type of nationalism. The Prophet is reported to have said: "Loving one's own land/county is part of his/her belief."

The second type of nationalism is devoid of any religious or spiritual content. This type of nationalism (ulusalcilik) propagates that the Turkish state is under threat and the country is on the verge of disintegration. Whoever is presented as a threat in this context may become a target for a tiny minority whose brains are washed by such an ideology. Given the nature of events and their perpetrators in Trabzon and Malatya, one can not to easily argue that the attackers had religious motivations. They seem to have had a mindset which is shaped by the concept of an "imagined threat" to state and society.

At this juncture one should also address the Turkish press which is sometimes given the burden of responsibility. It would not be fair to put all the press in the same category, yet, it is true that some publish news, articles and comments that may incite hatred. However, one cannot really see an obvious religious reason behind such publications. The media had been part of the "centre" elite in Turkey for many years. In recent decades however, the "periphery" is moving toward to centre. This social change is troubling the centre. The elite who enjoyed the privileges of the center is now resorting to scare-mongering propaganda and describing religious groups and movements as a threat to the country's regime: the role of the media is limited to creating an atmosphere of fear.

One of the reasons to be optimistic about the future of religious freedom in Turkey is the fact that freedom of religion is very important for the EU which is negotiating with Turkey about their full membership. By applying to become a full member of the EU, Turkey has already committed itself to harmonise its laws with that of Europe and internalise European values including democracy, human rights and freedom of religion. The EU accession process inspired a strong will in Turkey to lift any restrictions on religious liberty. Yet, there is still room for improvement. Given its restrictive interpretation and perception of secularism, Turkey should look at various European models as far as state-religion relations are concerned.

Europe has responsibility for the continuation of the hijab ban. The majority of Turks were disappointed when the ECHR decided that the headscarf ban in Turkey was not a violation of freedom of religion. Yet, on the other hand, the same EU is asking for more reforms in Turkey to provide and protect religious liberty. Currently, the Government is working on a new draft constitution. It seems that there is a large scale consensus that freedom of religion should be more strongly inserted in the constitution and a protective mechanism should be established. If Europe stops giving mixed messages, it would be much easier for the Turkish government to launch reforms that the public would readily support.

Talip Kucukcan is Associate Professor of Sociology, SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research

(Source: Muslim News, London)