The New Nation - Internet Edition

Malaysian elections: Badawi’s nightmare

Luqman Ong

The National front (BN - Barisan Nasional) coalition party of Government in Malaysia - led since Mahathir Mohamad stepped down in 2003 by his anointed successor, the soporific Abdullah Badawi - woke up with a jolt on post-general election day to the jubilant cheering of a loose coalition of opposition parties that are now in control in four states in peninsular Malaysia.

The BN Government now retains power in the 219-seat Parliament by only a simple majority, reducing its unfettered powers to change laws. The rag-tag opposition under the Barisan Rakyat (BR - Peoples Front) in one corner, and the Islamist PAS (Malaysian Islamic Party) in another, with a combined strength of 82 seats can now have a louder voice in Parliament, but in Malaysia it is in the states that the pull and tug of everyday politics are at play.

Malaysia is a Federation of thirteen states that were once pink tiles in the great mosaic of the British Empire. Of these, eleven are in peninsular Malaysia in the west, and two straddle the northern part of the great island of Borneo in the east. A vast body of water separates East Malaysia from its Western part and the political diversity between the parts is even bigger. It is to demography that one has to turn for a better understanding of political tensions. Roughly, Malaysia is divided by ethnic groups and religions, in a mix of many political colours.

It is this mix that makes Malaysian elections both interesting and volatile. In 1969, non-Malay voters showed how cross they were with the Government that had been ruling them since Independence (Merdeka) by transferring their crosses to ballot papers. As a result the mainly Chinese dominated political parties made many political headways. Some, spurred by the new political strength, made taunting noises at the "defeated" Muslim Malays during celebration rallies, though other versions say that it was the Malays who gave vent to their political anger by literally taking up their cudgels. Whatever the truth, the result was very ugly: riots broke out, mostly in the tourist island of Penang in the north-western peninsula, and in Selangor, the most prosperous state that hosts the Federal capital. Parliament was suspended, race-relations set back many years, and Malaysia was ruled under emergency powers by what was known as the National Operations Council.

In 1971, when Parliament was restored and democracy returned, there was much political rancour in the air, and racial misgivings were simmering to the boil. When the BN continued to rule after the disturbances, they introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) designed to give the native populations (the Malays and the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak, known collectively as the bumiputra, lit. "sons of the soil") a greater share in the national economy. That, said the political masters, was the root of all the troubles.

Life continued nevertheless. The ruling coalition chugged along, powered by the internal tension of its ethnic-based component parties; the Malays held on to what was left of their political power, the Chinese did what they are best at in finance and trade, and the Indians continued life in the professions and in working the sprawling estates. This is just a general demarcation that could lead to stereotypes. Infact there are many Chinese politicians, as many of Malay entrepreneurs as there are tilling the land, and there are many Indians above and many more below. Visitors to prosperous Malaysian towns can be forgiven if they believe that they are in Chinese towns, though some may feel the Malay and Indian undertow.

As the Malaysians got back to work, the misgivings about race and money continued to simmer, and if they did not come to the surface more often than they should it was because there was enough money for all. Or so it seemed.

The shock results in the last elections reducing Government powerless, was the result of many misgivings on a bed of subdued racial turmoil. The election is a figure in a varied background of shocking colours, many, no doubt, resulting from the short-sighted "vision" of the erstwhile Prime Minister Mahathir who rode Malaysia to gleaming prosperity at home and fame - some say notoriety - in the international arena. Mahathir was a business manager with little savvy for the political or social direction of the country.

He taunted many foreign enemies - some, like the one against international financial speculators, he did with success and panache - but there were many homegrown ones too that he thought he could sideline by his foppish ways. One was Anwar Ibrahim, a man with political nous and his former anointed deputy. He despatched Anwar to court and eventually, prison, on charges that ranged from corruption to sodomy. Mahathir, like many leaders with personal and political strength, suffered one major disability. He was unable to countenance a political equal, so, after Anwar, he appointed the political weakling and the much over-rated politician Abdullah Badawi as deputy and heir.

Anwar fought a very impressive campaign against Mahathir while inside prison, and he wasted no time rallying his supporters once his jail term was over. He gained many supporters among Malay Muslims, though to simply focus on them would be unfair to his far broader appeal. Because of his past conviction, he was not be eligible for elections until the end of March, and even thus disabled, he is still the only credible candidate among the opponents of BN to take over the helm of power. The Islamist PAS has no clout outside its peninsular east coast bases of power, or so it seemed. To outmanoeuvre Anwar and his broad-based Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR - Peoples Justice Party), Badawi called for elections for March 8, before Anwar was enabled for politics again. Abdullah also made the mistakes of setting an over-long campaign period, underestimated the strength of the opposition coalition, the Barisan Alternatif (The Alternative Front of Anwar's PKR) and the Chinese dominated Democratic Action Party, DAP; and failed to resolve the unrest among dispossessed Hindu Indians who have now found a rough and ominous voice in a group that calls itself Hindraf, the Hindu Rights Action Force.

While the Malays divided even further, the Chinese, ever resentful of the NEP, decided to throw in their lot with the PKR but mostly with the DAP. Kelantan, traditionally a PAS state in the peninsular north-east, returned PAS with even greater power, but bigger surprises awaited Badawi. By the combined force of the opposition, Perak, Selangor, Kedah and Penang states on the prosperous West coast of the peninsula fell to the opposition. Badawi has the reputation of being a man who falls asleep at crucial hours; now he has been jolted awake by a political nightmare.

Will Anwar return to politics? Definitely. At the end of March, when his enforced abstinence ends, his wife (who has been holding his political seat in the meanwhile) will step down and force a by-election where Anwar will be returned with a comfortable majority. Will Badawi go? It is very likely that the dominant Malay party in the Government coalition, UMNO, will throw him out as a liability. But with the standing of the Government's Chinese and Indian component parties now shattered and the opposition baying for power, there are interesting times ahead in this fragile country.

(Source: Muslim News, London)

Pakistan: Rethinking Afghanistan

S Khan

This is a proxy war which we are fighting on someone else's behalf; it has bathed our country in blood," stated a bystander on 'Bolta Pakistan' AAJ TV on 11 March.

On March 11, a week after blasts at Lahore's Naval College claimed the lives of 6 people and injured 19, two closely timed explosions wreaked renewed havoc in this historic city.

The first and deadliest to date in the sequence of attacks against military, paramilitary, and police personnel and installations occurred when a van packed with explosives rammed into the offices of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) on Temple Road in the city's bustling heart. The blast wrecked the 8-storey building, which housed the Special Investigations Unit, an anti-terror cell established following President Pervez Musharraf's decision to back George Bush's invasion of Afghanistan. Such was the blast's ferocity that its reverberations resounded 20 kilometres away. Claiming 23 lives, among them 3 children and 15 FIA officers, and injuring over a 100 others, it was followed by another explosion staged in parallel fashion at the premises of an ad agency. Mystification at the choice of target ebbed when news emerged that the agency fronted a safe house used jointly by FIA anti-terror agents and overseas investigative teams, currently probing the Naval College bombing.

The sharp intensification in the bombing campaign as it fans out from the tribal areas into major cities has stunned and angered the people, heightening the disconnect between their approach to their predicament on the one hand and that of the diminished Musharraf clique and its Neo-con patrons on the other. The disconnect had been a key factor in the rout of Musharraf's allies in the February elections as the electorate sought a reprieve from 8 years of military rule, including a departure from his Afghan policy. The post-election period has enhanced their hopes as the winning parties and former political rivals, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Muslim League-N have pledged to form a coalition with the Pushtun ANP, and prioritise the search for new policy directions.

The disconnect has its roots in conflictual understandings of the Afghan invasion. The public's opposition to the war was rife from the outset, and did not emerge as a by-product of Pakistan's collapsing security situation. The decision to submit to Neo-con ambitions came from a dictator unaccountable to his nation, but in need of international legitimation. Regardless of their disagreement with the Taliban, Pakistanis found no joy in watching daisy cutters rain upon a Muslim neighbour, especially one ravaged by two decades of conflict through superpower invasion and civil war. Moreover, they attributed responsibility for the latter to policy failures by the US and Pakistan.

Relatedly, given that the 50-year legacy of Pak-US alliances had strengthened dictatorships in Pakistan, people remained unmoved by the promises of 'Enduring Freedom'. Echoing other critical voices around the world, Pakistanis recognised the US push into Afghanistan as driven by long-term energy and security interests, including the containment of Iran and China and the potential exploitation of Central Asia's vast energy resources.

Tragically, Pakistanis find themselves at the sharp end of a war they had always opposed, which has spilled over the border and rages in their homeland in the form of an armed insurgency. Neo-con policy pundits may technicise the insurgency as a series of unfortunate events perpetrated by 'terrorists', and 'extremists. They may console its grieving people that these are containable through increased military action and further security measures such as expanding the scope of foreign surveillance operations within Pakistan. However, Pakistanis take a less sanguine view of asymmetric warfare, which, they argue, can continue for decades. They also note that the combination of military means and 'actionable intelligence' has functioned as a euphemism for a war on one's own people, the slaughter of innocents by Musharraf's helicopter gunships or American Predators and Drones, the displacements of tens, possibly hundreds of thousands, the disappearance of hundreds perhaps thousands, the militarisation of a semi-autonomous tribal region where other Pakistani generals, folly and bravado notwithstanding, never ventured in their jackboots.

Pakistanis connect Musharraf's military-security package to the radicalisation of the border Pushtuns. With linguistic and ethnic cross-border ties, Pushtuns were doubly aggrieved at Musharraf's support for Bush, but once at the mercy of the general's firepower, they hit back without mercy at the emblems of his power. Making common cause with their kinsmen across the border, they came to see Musharraf as the local face of global power. Hence the rise of the 'Local Taliban', and as in Afghanistan, some speculate that they may form part of a nexus that includes al Qa'ida.

Other theories see the insurgency as a bid by external powers to destabilise and denuclearise Pakistan, but the emphasis remains on seeing Afghanistan/ Waziristan as the nub of the problem.

Accordingly, while Neo-cons view Pakistan almost exclusively through the lens of expediency coloured by their Afghan venture, Pakistanis seek new terms of engagement in which they no longer subsidise Musharraf's fetish for Bush's imperial quest. Its excessive costs may be seen statistically.

In 2007, approximately 1,700 Pakistanis died through various incidents of violence. From January-mid-March 2008, 600 Pakistanis died in 71 incidents. From 2001-2008, coalition fatalities in Afghanistan totalled 775. Of these the greatest losses are American at 486 whereas estimates of Pakistani soldiers' deaths range from 1,500-2,000.

The public's call to review current policy is echoed by many defence and foreign policy analysts, retired generals and ambassadors, academics, journalists, lawyers, and newly elected parliamentarians. Although no single blueprint for salvation has emerged, there is agreement that a bold multi-pronged political initiative by a government with national legitimacy may prove effective, especially as a precursor to a wider regional settlement on Afghanistan. Proponents of political dialogue often cite Britain's success with the IRA as an example. However, such is the imperial oversight of Pakistani affairs that the day after the Lahore blasts, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice found it necessary to foreclose the possibility of dialogue, saying that another way was needed. Concurrently, if in support, US forces staged a 'precision guided' strike in Waziristan killing two women and two children.

Rice's intervention complements the Bush administration's assiduous efforts to prevent Musharraf's ouster. Whereas Washington sees him as 'indispensable' to the pursuit of the war, Pakistanis see his departure or at minimum his bowing to parliament as indispensable to Pakistan's stability. Graced by plummeting ratings in the twilight of his presidency, Bush is determined that the inconvenience of an electoral verdict must not be allowed to displace his protégé. The chorus of US officials in DC and the frenetic diplomatic forays in Islamabad into post-election coalition building have managed to rile even pro-western liberals in Pakistan. In a recent newspaper article, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger corroborates these attempts saying, "Any attempt to manipulate the political process that we have urged is likely to backfire. A wise policy must recognise that the internal structure of Pakistani politics is essentially out of the control of American decision-making."

But 'wise policies' are unlikely to emerge as the legacy of Bush's imperial despotism.

Bloodshed and chaos are. As such breaking with Musharraf's legacy on Afghanistan presents a formidable challenge for the new government.

(Source: Muslim News, London)

Tranquility in remembrance

Shelina Zahra

The Qur'anic stories of the Prophets offer us a reminder and an emotional connection towards the spirituality that Muslims strive for. Shelina Zahra Janmohamed is therefore troubled by an increasing negativity towards remembrance and emotion.

This year, the occasion of Easter and the occasion of the birth of Prophet Muhammad, fall very close to each other. Both are clearly incredibly significant events to the faiths of Christianity and Islam respectively. Both mark the lives of individuals who have made a world-changing contribution (universe-changing some might say). Easter weekend falls from March 21 to March 24, whilst the birthday of the Prophet falls somewhere between the 20 and the 25, depending on which sources of history you refer to - the Islamic date usually being either the 12th or 17th of the 3rd Islamic month Rabi' al-Awwal.

Easter - along with the other occasions of the Christian calendar - appears to me to be a unifying event for the Christian community. I do not agree with the doctrine it reinforces (having chosen to be a Muslim rather than a Christian), but I do admire its focus and reflection on an historical event that can stir emotions and also shed light on our current and future circumstances.

It is an undeniable truth that the study of history and its remembrance is an aid to mapping a wiser brighter future. That is why Scripture - like the Qur'an - recounts the stories of Prophets and communities past, so that we can reflect on what happened to them, why it happened, and then avoid their mistakes. And the very point of narrating the stories and parables of these human guides is to offer an emotional connection and a human example of spirituality and worship.

The Qur'an repeatedly remembers what has happened to the Prophets and peoples before us. It tells us that the Prophets were sent as bearers of good news and guidance but also as warners. It re-iterates their stories in chapter after chapter, reminding us of their birth, lives and deaths and urging us to remember them and what they said to their people. Surah Saffat (The Ranks, Chapter 37) for example, is a poetic essay of the lives of the salihîn, the good. It tells us about Prophets such as Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Lot, Moses and Aaron. After the individual commemoration of each Prophet, the Qur'an says, salâm, peace, to each one. In case we missed this repetition, it rounds off the chapter by saying, salâm, to all the messengers, and then praises Allah.

With all of this in mind, I have been startled in recent years by the growing numbers of messages I receive in the form of emails, newsletters and sombre advice telling me that I should refrain from remembering events such as the birthday of the Prophet. Such advice sometimes goes as far as to tell me it is harâm (forbidden) to commemorate the Prophet's birth. I am told not to commemorate his birth or death, not to mark the death of near or respected individuals, not to spend time in spiritual reflection on various nights throughout the year, not to remember the dead.

I find this deeply troubling. The sign of a mature community is one that can reflect on what has past. It needs to study what has happened and learn the lessons of history and then move forward. Where we found ourselves wanting, we must mourn and then convert our remorse into a more positive future. Where we found good, we must rejoice. To stop remembrance severs our roots. It leaves us floating precariously in an unanchored vacuum where we have no frame of reference. That is when we become weak and pale as a people.

What I also find troubling is that this growing negativity towards remembrance is aimed at quashing human emotion as a component of faith. There is an emotional value that remembrance brings to our faith, and by denying remembrance we are eroding the emotion of faith. It is natural for human beings to be joyful and emotional in remembering those who have done good to them - particularly when they have sacrificed their lives to bring us that goodness. The Prophet is the best example of this. It is the natural condition for a Muslim to feel love and happiness in relation towards him. In fact, the Qur'an tells us that the people asked the Prophet what he wanted in exchange for teaching them about Islam and the Qur'an answers that all he wanted is muwaddah, love. We should bear in mind that the Qur'an tells us that even Allah and the angels send their blessings on the Prophet, and that those who believe do the same. The fitrah (innate nature) of the human being is to remember. It is also the fitrah of the human being that he or she will rush in the direction in which emotion pulls it.

Without that emotion to drive it, the path is arid and laborious. Infused with emotion and remembrance it appeals to the instinct which is placed in each human's heart to reach for the Divine. Remembrance is what opens the heart and creates love and tranquillity.

The theological arguments about whether the birthday of the Prophet should be celebrated or not will continue to rage, I'm sure. However, as people centred around faith and spirituality, what we do need is an understanding that remembrance - in whatever way people choose to exercise it - is a crucial component of our community ethos.

(Shelina Zahra Janmohamed has her own blog at www.spirit21.co.uk )