The New Nation - Internet Edition

Justin Wintle

Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe', Winston Churchill told the British House of Commons in November 1947, famously adding: 'No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried from time to time.' He declined, however, to explain what the shortcomings of democracy might be. With the help of the United States he had seen off the threat of German fascism, and had already identified the threats implicit in Soviet totalitarianism. For him, democracy just was the proper way of life, worthy of championing, whatever the cost in 'blood, toil, tears and sweat'.

Sixty years on we have good reason to feel less confident about Churchill's 'least-worst' reasoning. Global warming and an endemic despoliation of natural environments are attributable to a rampant worldwide consumerism fed by a troika of capital, techno-industrialisation and, especially, democracy. Where they have a choice, the majority will always tend to vote for the party that promises to raise their immediate, material living standards. And even where a democratic choice does not exist, the effect may be the same, as governments succour their subjects by enabling them to acquire a lifestyle that apes the Western model.

The most obvious example of the latter is post-Mao China. While the Chinese politburo abides by the premise that only a highly centralised, strong-arm government can deliver the stability and order ('harmony') needed to bind a vast land and people together in a condition of peace, it has become a commonplace that the purposive denizens of China's teeming cities want nothing more than to enjoy the material prosperity most obviously associated with the United States.

China, it may be said, enjoys (or suffers) the fruits of democracy without the distractions of an actual democracy. So long as the population at large is able to vigorously nibble away at the carrot of prosperity, government will not run into serious difficulties in maintaining, if not the strong support, at the least the tacit compliance of the people it controls. Destabilisation, when it does come, will be (in the first instance) a consequence of an economic downturn, not ideological resistance. Conversely, the one part of the planet where opposition to destructive consumerism promoted by the West is effective is in those Islamic territories where a rock-hard religious ideology pertains. Ironically, the Islamicist programme - fiercely antithetical to capitalism, industrialism and democracy alike - looks, at this point in time, a better bet for the healthy continuance of Planet Earth than its rivals. But culturally it is non-saleable to the rest of humanity, and the challenge for Islam lies not in expanding its remit but in holding on to what it already has. Islam therefore is unlikely to play a major role in containing and reversing the consumerist contagion. Rather, the rest of humanity must look to itself.

The solution, if solution there is, must be eclectic. Yet at every turn obstacles arise. Overwhelmingly it is obvious that population management is de rigueur - more people simply means more consumption. Yet (and hats off to it) the People's Republic alone has attempted to legislate against population growth. Western governments, rather than promote meaningful shrinkage, still equate the holy grail of economic growth with a positive birth rate and expansionist demographics. Limiting the size of families by decree is perceived as an assault on individual liberty. Again, intra-national competition emasculates the green ideal. So long as an effectively binding global agreement to contain pollution remains elusive, individual states owe it to their majoritative constituencies to pursue bullish economic policies. The 'anti-capitalist' movement - no longer rooted in Marxist dogma - is none the less routinely castigated and marginalised. Those most ardently concerned with the well-being of global ecology are demonised as wreckers.

As China demonstrates, capital-driven techno-industrialised economic liftoff can be achieved without democratisation. Yet conceivably 'democracy' still holds one key. It is not a system, much less an idea, that is about to vanish, however ineptly democracy is actually practised in its signed-up states. Its promise of a participatory, inclusive politics is simply too strong a desideratum to be tossed aside. But the moment has come to reconsider its design.

Democracy has come a long journey since its (supposed) initial adumbration in ancient, slave-owning Athens. In medieval Europe it was unwittingly revived in a variety of parliaments composed of stakeholder elite. Today, democracy exhibits a variety of electoral systems based on universal adult suffrage, militating against the simple Athenian rule by a majority of 'free' males (which can also mean rule of the mob). Proportional representation has become widely favoured over the older 'first-past-the-post' system. Some newer European constitutions, too, guarantee the rights and interests of minorities.

More generally, such rights as freedom of expression and freedom of movement have become embedded in democratic ideology. Democracy now means not just the right to vote, but also the right to an education, to healthcare, to a pension - historically a dazzling programme of socialistic benefits that seem most effectively paid for by enabling a full-blooded wealth-producing but also taxable capitalist enterprise to run side-by-side a welfare state.

Which is all well and good. But the fly in the ointment is that voters are seldom satisfied with educational, healthcare and pension provision. They want a whole lot more. They want their gas-guzzling motorcars, their jetplane holidays in faraway places, and their proliferating household electronic gadgets. They want as big a carbon footprint as they can get for themselves, and will not vote for a party that shapes to deny them these things. At any rate, that is how it is in the West - which is why the West is such an excruciating example to the rest of the world. So what is to be done?

Confucius may have the answer. While Western democracy is an evolving programme, in one respect it remains inflexible. The concept of one-citizen one-vote has ossified into an iron shibboleth.

That all adult citizens should have the vote makes sense enough, if only on the ground that it is better to include as many as possible within the political process. But why insist that every voter in the land carry exactly the same political weight? Is it really to society's advantage that an eighteen-year-old drug addict has no less political 'authority' than say a hard-working professor three times his age? Which of the two is better equipped to vote for sensible policies?

Confucius urged respect for the elderly, for parents, for teachers, and for those who observe the 'rites' that bind society together. We need an electoral system that does the same, as a means of promoting electoral responsibility.

What I am suggesting is that every adult should continue to have a vote, but that adults who have proven their commitment to the public good should be rewarded with additional votes. Thus an extra vote might be given every adult who attains the age of fifty. Additional votes might also be accorded parents, where parents remain together and preserve the family. Such a 'Confucian' electorate could be enhanced in other ways. Individuals could acquire extra ballot papers by virtue of being a teacher, a doctor, a civil servant, a policeman, a magistrate, a member of the armed forces: for it makes moral as well as practical sense that those who put most into society, or show themselves capable of self-sacrifice, should have a greater say in determining how society is run.

Conversely, those achieving excessive wealth could be stripped of any additional votes accrued: they have already gained enough from society. Ditto convicted criminals. Ditto too politicians, at least until such time as they cease being politicians. They have power enough.

Such a reconfiguration of the franchise would of course privilege 'conservative' voting patterns, but that is the very point. The need to 'conserve' should now take precedence over the will to exploit. Older citizens, and citizens who have performed well in the public sector, would be more likely to vote for governments mindful of the true common good, not just immediate advantage. And this in turn would encourage a new political agenda, to be placed before socially redesigned electorates.

A Confucian franchise would also institute accumulative citizenship. Having one vote at (say) eighteen puts you on the first, lowest rung of political responsibility, but there would still be much to play for thereafter. This would reinvigorate democracy, where democracy has fallen into cynical disrepute, encouraging parties and governments to take their long-term responsibilities seriously. A Confucian democracy of the kind suggested would empower collective wisdom - something too long absent from democratic politics, however outmoded the term. It is improbable, though, that such a radical reform of the franchise could, in the first instance, be introduced into any Western state. Existing franchises would vote against it. It would be perceived as 'reactionary' and 'elitist', for all that self-evidently what is proposed is a non-exclusive electoral gradation open to all.

But how about the People's Republic itself? In one fell swoop the emergent superpower could leapfrog its Western counterpart in the fairness stakes, to produce an exemplary electoral system marvellously attuned to the exigencies of the times. Incorporating traditional, tested Chinese values, a 'Confucian' democracy would also safeguard the Chinese state against future instability.

All this may seem a pie in the sky, a fun balloon released into the New Year ether and nothing more, but I make no apology. The sky and the ether are already critically damaged, the same as Mother Earth. The need to think 'outside the box' about the structural relations between governments and the governed within a global context has become paramount. If we fail in this, then (pace Churchill) it may not matter two cents what type of government - least-worst or any otherwise - prevails.