The New Nation - Internet Edition

The bigger picture

Amira Howeidy

Palestinian strategist Mounir Shafiq predicted current tensions with Iran four years ago. He argues in interview with Amira Howeidy that the balance of power is not in favour of the US or Israel, if only the Arabs would listen

The last time Mounir Shafiq visited Cairo everything was different: the buildings, the streets, and even the people. Palestinian intellectual, ex- Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) strategist, Christian Marxist turned Islamist, Shafiq hasn't set foot in Egypt for 30 years. He tells me the prevalence of the hijab, or headscarf, took him by surprise. So did the noticeable number of expensive A-class cars -- indication of "the rise of a privileged class", which, as in other Arab capitals, like Amman where he resides, is a reflection of a rising "globalised strata that puts emphasis on appearances".

Born to a wealthy Palestinian Christian family in West Jerusalem's Qatamoun neighbourhood in 1936, Shafiq's life of political activism, imprisonment and ideological development wasn't predictable.

Following Israel's occupation of West Jerusalem in 1948, his family moved to East Jerusalem -- which was under Jordanian administration -- where, by the age of 12, he became a political activist and joined the Jordanian Communist Party, remaining in it for 14 years. He spent most of his 20s in prison, serving 10 years for "communism, demonstrating and slandering the powers that be". During that time he shifted to Nasserism, thereafter joining the then powerful and popular and Palestinian Fatah resistance faction in 1968. In 1972 he joined the PLO's strategic centre, becoming its director in 1978 and earning a reputation for being one of the most insightful and shrewd of Palestinian strategic thinkers.

His conversion to Islam came when he felt that communism was lacking the necessary elements to realise change, liberation, the unity of the Arab nation and social justice. "I felt that Marxism suffered a sort of estrangement in addressing these vital issues," he explained.

It is his unique Islamic, pan-Arab, Marxist and Maoist background that made Shafiq's analytical and strategic take on regional and world politics exceptionally profound. He published over 40 books on the Palestinian question, Arab unity, Leninist-Marxist thought, the science of war, Islam, secularism, development and the new world order.

As we chat in downtown Cairo's Shephard Hotel café, he is reluctant, after his 30-year absence, to make critical comments about the Egypt that he loves. I push him. He remains diplomatic.

"What is happening in Cairo now on the economic level and in urban development is part of the 'political and strategic line' that began during the time of Anwar El-Sadat," he finally says. "It is a line that seeks integration with the capitalist world system. I believe in the theory that finds it necessary to create a balance between privatisation and the role of the state in monitoring capital," which is lacking in Egypt as much as elsewhere in the Arab world. "The outcome will be negative because there can't be development in the absence of social justice," he continued.

"We are still in a conflict with the Israeli enemy. And our Arab nation is still the subject of imperial aspirations and aggressions. With the advent of the George Bush administration seven years ago it was clear that a war was declared on the Arab and Islamic nation, Egypt included. This war isn't just political; it has social aspects as well. It is no secret that there are neo-con plans to change our societies to serve the Zionist project and its values. Even 'moderate' Arab regimes are targeted. The war on our nation remains declared." More attention, Shafiq says, should be given to Arab national security, self-sufficiency and internal unity.

"We should have joint Arab projects in the fields of education, health and social development, and the way I see it this kind of thinking contradicts the prevailing globalisation tendencies. This requires serious joint planning and policies that can create an Arab common market, not the suggested 'New Middle East'."

But how realistic are these aspirations?

"Unfortunately, I see contradictions between the policies of Arab governments in general and their position in the balance of power. These regimes can actually be more powerful -- it is their policies that are weak, as if there's a psychological complex that prohibits any confrontation between the US, Israel and us. This kind of thinking should be abolished."

According to Shafiq, the current balance of power is as follows: "the Israeli Ehud Olmert government is very weak. The Bush administration is also very weak. The Arabs could have taken advantage of this. And yet until now they didn't. The current balance of power isn't in favour of the US and Israel. The evidence is the fall of the 'New Middle East' project. And all the wars that were waged [on us] are now in crisis and on the path of defeat. Meanwhile our peoples have demonstrated an ability to resist to the point where the Israeli army was defeated in Lebanon."

It is of vital importance, therefore, that the Arabs get rid of the notion dominant since the early 1990s that the "US is the absolute ruler, that it shouldn't be confronted, and those who oppose it are doomed or will be thrown out of history and time."

Things and nations have changed, he insists. "Look at how Russia restored its greatness and role in the international community. Look at China's progress and its invasion of world markets. It's even signing oil agreements. Look at India. Look at Latin America and how most of its countries have revised the policies that prevailed in the 1990s that proved to be illusionary. Back then, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the false notion was that the world has to succumb to the US as the only superpower and that the only remaining ideology was liberalism and Zionist-dominated Western ideology. All this proved to be wrong and weak. We live in a multi-polar world now and there is world chaos."

It's true, points out Shafiq, that in the measure of strength the US is stronger than any other state, but "it's not stronger than the world and this is the main point." And there is a counter power, he says, which consists of all the states whose interests are in one way or another in conflict with US interests. This includes Europe, Russia, China, India and Brazil, among others.

But Germany and France are in harmony with US policies. "There was always a NATO alliance, but that doesn't mean there was no conflict of interest between its parties. During 2004, the US realised it needs an alliance with Europe and no longer wanted to neglect NATO or the UN. It revived the alliance by making American concessions, not the opposite.

"Countries like Germany and France resorted to a role that the US had denied them in the past. If you remember in 2002 the Americans divided Europe into 'old' and 'new' countries and tried to snub Germany, France, the UN and NATO. Now these countries take initiatives to the detriment of the US. In Lebanon for example, the UN Interim Force [UNIFIL] is run by the Europeans, which in other circumstances wouldn't have been allowed by the US. Even during the Clinton administration, the Americans wouldn't allow the Europeans to attend the meetings between Israel, the US and the Palestinians. Now things have changed."

Is this because of the war on Iraq? "The main reason is that the unipolar system theory is flawed. Creating a world order based on that theory contradicts in essence the greater interests of other countries and therefore has no future. It's an illusion and is disconnected from reality. Nobody even talks about the unipolar system anymore. The mere fact that the US resorted to the UN is evidence of a multipolar system because both the UN and NATO countries have veto power. When the US wanted to invade Iraq, it replaced the UN with the 'coalition of the willing' because it didn't want to share decision-making with anyone. Again this has changed."

Which leads, he adds, to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's famous "constructive chaos" theory.

"A considerable number of people actually believed that the US would reshape the region, but when they saw its defeat in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, and that both the Bush and Olmert governments are in a desperate shape, and they heard Rice's statement on 'constructive chaos', they understood this is America's policy; that the US adopted a strategy of creating chaos.

"Didn't they realise that a power that seeks chaos actually lacks control? If the US is in control it won't create chaos. This isn't an American policy or strategy; it's an attempt to save face. 'Constructive chaos' exposes the weakness, failure and defeat of the US. Why didn't Rice talk about constructive chaos when the US was launching its war on Iraq? Or when she spoke about America's national security? This theory only surfaced after failure. Even when she spoke about the war on Lebanon she called it the 'birth pangs' of a new Middle East."

Now that the seven-year Bush administration is about to end, will we see changes in US foreign policy?

Shafiq explains that the priority of the neo-con strategy after 11 September was "to create a new Middle East that responds to the Zionist Israeli project. Meanwhile big powers that possess competing abilities with the US were not a priority." He explains that in the past seven years the US made concessions to Russia, China and other countries in return for their support for America's policies in the Middle East.

"This greatly damaged America's strength. Russia managed to rebuild its state and purified it from Zionist and Americanised elements and placed itself on the world map as a great nation that possesses missiles and bombs. The US also allowed China to invade world markets at unprecedented speed. India and Latin American countries were also given the chance to rebel against the US. America sacrificed all this to serve its priority in changing the Middle East -- something it has failed in doing."

Shafiq concludes: "America certainly didn't choose the right priority by focussing on the impoverished and weak Arab and Muslim nation and leaving its real competitors to take giant leaps forward." Shafiq suspects that the US will shift its priorities in the coming period. Will it return to the theory of "containing" Russia and now China, he asks rhetorically.

Yet despite this upcoming change in priorities, Shafiq believes it's "inevitable" that the US will attack Iran. Says the strategist: "Decision-making in the US administration is still dominated by the influential Zionist lobby. Attacking Iran is a decision that has been made by the neo-cons and the Jewish state because Tehran is not allowed to possess the ability to enrich uranium, even for peaceful purposes and even if it meets all conditions of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is simply not allowed. Therefore if Iran doesn't hand over its nuclear programme its nuclear sites at least will be attacked, even if it suspends uranium enrichment."

A war on Iran would be the most dangerous step in the region, he adds, as Iran would retaliate and the war could rapidly expand. "If the US starts a war, it would need to use tactical, or 'precision' nuclear weapons. I would say 50- 60,000 people would get killed. If Iran tolerates this, the US will be defeated because the nuclear bomb's importance lies in its moral rather than physical impact. The entire world will turn against America."

Similarly in Gaza which Israel is threatening to attack to uproot Hamas, the situation is not entirely bleak.

Hamas, he suggests, will win in any confrontation with Israel regardless of the military outcome of the possible incursion Tel Aviv says it will wage. "If Israel does what it says it will do, even Hamas's harshest critics will have to denounce it. And if Hamas withstands the aggression and fights back it will put Israel in a tight corner."

But the Palestinians' greater challenge is not in the besieged Gaza Strip, he warns, but in the West Bank where Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is proceeding in secret negotiations with Israel for a final settlement agreement. Shafiq strongly suspects it involves disarming the resistance, renouncing the Palestinian right of return and recognising Israel's Jewishness. "This is the greater danger we should be aware of and it surpasses anything else in its importance and impact on the future of the Palestinian question."

(Source: Al-Ahram weekly)

No competition in Egyptian polls

Gamal Essam El-Din

With more than 90 per cent of the ruling NDP's candidates standing unopposed in next month's municipal election no one doubts the results.

When the deadline for nomination in next month's municipal elections passed on 13 March a total of 57,000 candidates had registered. The figure is not as excessive as it sounds: a staggering 52,000 seats on 4,500 councils at the village, district, town and governorate levels are being contested.

The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) will contest every seat, fielding 52,000 official candidates. Ahmed Ezz, the NDP's secretary for organisational affairs, said the final list was whittled down from 82,000 NDP hopefuls.

While registration for the NDP's candidates appears to have been an easy process -- Ezz says as many as 74,000 were able to register just an hour before the door closed on nominations -- the same is not true for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and opposition parties. On 15 March the Brotherhood called a press conference at which Mahdi Akef, the group's supreme guide, told reporters that of the 10,000 candidates it had hoped to field only 5,754 were able to complete the necessary papers and of these just 498 were allowed to register.

Since it decided to contest the municipal council elections more than a month ago the group has been subjected to a heavy-handed security crackdown. More than 850 members have been arrested, including 187 of its municipal election candidates. In the press conference Akef predicted that such repressive tactics would backfire, warning that in closing channels for peaceful opposition the people's "only option is to explode".

The arrests have provoked criticism from abroad, not least in Washington. On 12 March a White House spokesperson expressed concern at "the continuing campaign of arrests in Egypt of individuals who are opponents of the current governing party and are involved in the upcoming local elections," adding that US President George Bush "expects" President Hosni Mubarak to ensure that municipal elections, scheduled on 8 April, are free and fair. In Cairo a Foreign Ministry spokesman described the statement as "unobjective".

The Brotherhood was not the only group that faced obstacles in registering candidates. Opposition parties say that at least half of their own candidates were prevented from standing, while those who did mange to register their names will find the odds stacked against them.

The daily opposition Al-Wafd reports that only 700 out of 1,700 members who had hoped to stand were able to complete the nomination procedure. The Tagammu and Nasserist parties fared even worse, with just 400 out of 1,200 candidates successfully nominated. This means that the NDP will face no opposition in more than 90 per cent of seats.

With such a bleak picture in which the NDP dominates more than 95 per cent of the list of candidates, pundits say that there will be no competition in next month's municipal elections to start with. In other words, NDP candidates would win at least 90 per cent of contested seats -- unopposed. Amr Hashem Rabie, an analyst with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, expects the municipal elections to be a rerun of the Shura council poll of March 2007, certainly in terms of the results. The NDP won 99.9 per cent of Shura council seats. While this is clearly a political setback, Rabie views the elections as clarifying the complex relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. "The pre-election security tactics underline the extent to which the regime views the Brotherhood as the biggest threat to Egypt's national security. It has decided that its only course is to drive the Brotherhood from political life."

The decision, says Rabie, has been reinforced by Hamas's popular success in Gaza. Hamas is itself an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

As far as the regime is concerned, believes Rabie, any complaints from the White House are far outweighed by "the dangers of integrating the Brothers into political life". He also sees the removal of the Brotherhood from the political arena as integral to any plans for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father as president in 2011. Mohamed Ragab, NDP spokesman in the Shura Council, points out that while the White House asked the Palestinians to conduct free and fair elections in 2006, when Hamas won the Americans' response was to say that they could not recognise a terrorist organisation.

"Does the White House want to repeat the same scenario with Egypt? Does anyone think we are stupid enough to compromise national security simply to please Washington?" he asks.

The war between the authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood, argues Rabie, is distorting political life to a dangerous extent and should be brought to a halt. "I would encourage the Brotherhood and the regime to embark on some sort of dialogue," he says, "which should be conditional on the Brotherhood declaring a national programme based on the principles of citizenship and civil society." In the absence of such dialogue Rabie thinks the greatest danger is that "Brotherhood members will eventually turn to underground work."

Rabie is also critical of opposition parties which, he says, have been too quiet for their own good. Rabie thinks it "regretable" that opposition party leaders failed to expose even the obstacles their own candidates faced as they attempted to register for the elections. "Unlike the Brotherhood, they did not hold a press conference to protest against the unfairness of the difficulties they face though doubts loom that there is a secret deal with the NDP in which they will get some seats in return for keeping silent."

A total of 330 committees have been tasked with scrutinising the thousands of appeals filed by candidates. They will report on 22 March, allowing the final list of candidates to be announced on Sunday.

A coup by any other name

Gareth Jenkins

Public Prosecutor Abdul-Rahman Yalcinkaya the other day filed a case with the Turkish Constitutional Court calling for the closure of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) on the grounds that it had become a centre for attempts to undermine the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish constitution. Yalcinkaya also called for 71 members of the JDP to be banned from all political activity. They include Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and most of the rest of the party's leadership.

The court is expected to rule on whether or not the application meets the procedural requirements by the end of this month, after which the JDP will have a month to present its initial defence. In the past, party closure cases have usually taken anything from eight months to several years to be concluded.

Hardline Turkish secularists have always been suspicious of the JDP's ultimate intentions. The JDP was formed in 2001 from the remnants of a succession of political parties which had been outlawed for allegedly trying to undermine secularism. There is no dispute that, in their youth, JDP leaders such as Erdogan frequently espoused a hardline interpretation of Islam and even sometimes called for the introduction of Sharia law. However, in the run-up to the JDP's victory in the general election of November 2002, Erdogan and the other party leaders maintained that they had changed and repeatedly expressed their commitment to secularism. Nor, during its first five years in government, did the JDP attempt to introduce any radical, anti-secular measures.

However, if anything, the JDP's moderation appears to have made hardline secularists even more suspicious. They refused to accept that the JDP leaders really had changed, maintaining that they were just biding their time until they felt strong enough to implement a radical Islamist agenda. Nor was the JDP unaware of how it was regarded by the secular Turkish establishment, particularly the country's still powerful military. During its first five years in power, the JDP sought to avoid confrontation and backed down whenever the military expressed disapproval of any of its policy initiatives.

The change came in spring 2007 when the military intervened to try to prevent the JDP from appointing Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to the presidency. The JDP responded by calling an early general election which it won by a landslide, taking 46.6 per cent of the popular vote. Over the months that followed, the Turkish military adopted a low profile, apparently unwilling to risk another humiliating rebuff from the Turkish electorate.

Emboldened by what it regarded as the secular establishment being cowed into silence, since July last year, the JDP has not only appointed Gul to the presidency but pushed ahead with a series of initiatives which challenge the traditional interpretation of secularism in Turkey, most recently by trying to lift the ban which prevents women wearing headscarves from attending university. But, even if the military has remained silent, the response from the other bastion of the Turkish establishment, namely the judiciary, has demonstrated that the JDP's confidence was, at best, premature. Yalcinkaya's decision to press for the closure of the JDP stunned not only the party but the entire country and looks set to overshadow the political agenda for months to come.

Yalcinkaya's attempts to close down a party which has the support of nearly half the Turkish electorate has triggered protests from outside and inside the country, including from some of the JDP's opponents.

"Turkey can't get anywhere by closing down parties," said Sinan Aygun, the chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce. "I may be extremely critical of the government but I can't support such a disastrous initiative."

Ollie Rehn, the Commissioner for Enlargement for the EU, which Turkey still hopes to join, dryly noted: "It is difficult to say that this respects the democratic principles of a normal European country."

Erdogan was characteristically blunt. "Our people don't deserve this," he said, warning Yalcinkaya that he, rather than the JDP, would suffer the most from the application.

But the real problem is probably not so much Yalcinkaya's application but the often draconian Turkish laws under which it was filed. A large proportion of his 162 page indictment consists of quotations from speeches given by leading JDP officials. Most are fairly innocuous. However, there are statements which, even if they are acceptable in most countries in the world, would appear to be illegal under Turkish law. For example, Yalcinkaya has indicted four local JDP officials from the provincial town of Nigde who campaigned in the 2007 election under the slogan "An end to 84 years of darkness", in a reference to the 1923 foundation of the Turkish Republic from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Regardless of whether or not it should be illegal, under Turkish law, political parties are forbidden from working for the overthrow of the existing constitutional order.

There is a small possibility that the Constitutional Court will simply refuse to consider the case. However, the general expectation is that it will decide to hear Yalcinkaya's application. As a result, even if the court eventually rules not to close the JDP, Turkey faces a long period of uncertainty and potential instability at a time when the economy is slowing and social divisions deepening, not just between the JDP and secularists but also between nationalist Turks and Kurds. Yet even many of the JDP's opponents admit that this is exactly what they want to help them in their efforts to close down the JDP. However, it is crystal clear that banning popular leaders from politics and closing down their party would simply be a recipe for chaos.

(Source: Al-Ahram Weekly)