The New Nation - Internet Edition

Ashok K. Behuria

The political forces in Pakistan would like the Army to stay on as a prop, an insurance against any politician with despotic ambitions, comments Ashok K. Behuria

Pakistan is getting ready for the next elections amid many uncertainties. General Musharraf is caught between the PPP (Pakistan People's Party) and PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam). Benazir Bhutto is back in Pakistan without any express assurance that she could have a third term as prime minister. Chaudhury Shujaat Hussain is undecided about Musharraf's reconciliation proposals and is hobnobbing with PML-Nawaz. Within the PPP, Benazir is soft on Musharraf while veteran party leader Aitzaz Ahsan is baying for the General's blood. The MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) is torn from within; Qazi Hussain wants total confrontation while Maulana Fazlur Rehman wants cautious accommodation. Anti-Musharraf combines like the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) are defunct. The MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement) is sitting on the fence. Every political actor who counts appears tentative about his/her next move.

The judiciary is proactive. However, it is vacillating between the lure of taking on the Army and the anxiety that it may overreach in provoking the Army to undermine the institution of judiciary itself. Issues awaiting the judiciary's pronouncement include the return of the Sharifs, legality of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), and Musharraf's re-election as president with uniform. Each issue has the potential of setting Pakistan on a roller coaster ride.

Meanwhile, there have been three interesting opinion polls, which provide some clues about the popular perception of the political situation in the country. The first, by the International Republican Institute (IRI) of the US Republican Party, came seven days before Benazir landed in Pakistan. It said that Musharraf, Benazir and Nawaz had popularity ratings of 21%, 28% and 36% respectively; Musharraf, it may be noted, had 63% approval rating in a poll conducted by IRI in September 2006. Another interesting turn in the results was the massive opposition to Musharraf's re-election with uniform (74%). In February 2007, just before he moved against the Chief Justice, more than 50% had approved of his re-election as President.

Another poll, conducted by ACNielsen Pakistan for WorldPublicOpinion.org weeks before Benazir's return, but brought out on 20 October, suggested that Musharraf, Benazir and Nawaz had popularity ratings of 21%, 27% and 21% respectively. The latest, by Outlook India, says that the attack on Benazir has not kicked off any sympathy wave in her favour.

In other words, Musharraf's popularity has plummeted since the episode involving Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry; while Nawaz Sharif's has risen since his aborted trip back home in September. Benazir has found it difficult to go beyond the 20-30% mark in popularity ratings for a long time. Her deal with Musharraf has rather depleted her support base among the moderates.

Let us now see the electoral prospect of different parties, as almost 78 mn Pakistani electorate get ready to elect 272 members of the National Assembly and 577 members of the provincial assemblies. The political situation, as it obtains today, gives Benazir's PPP a distinct lead over others in rural Sindh, while urban Sindh is likely to side with MQM. Benazir has some committed followers in Punjab, and given the PPP's past performance, it may win about 10-15% of popular vote from the province in a situation most favourable to her. The rest of the Punjab will be divided between pro-Musharraf and pro-Nawaz forces, with Jamiat-i-Islami likely to secure its share of 45% of popular votes.

The last local elections in August 2005 showed the declining influence of MMA in the NWFP (North West Frontier Province). But with state action against the militants in full swing, the MMA, especially JUI-F (Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazl), is likely to retain its hold in the province. Popular disenchantment with MMA may shift marginally towards the nationalists and thus the Awami National Party (ANP) may stage a better performance. PPP and PML-Q are unlikely to sping any electoral surprise, while PML-N may show some gains because of its anti-Musharraf image and its sympathies for Islam.

Popular sympathy in Balochistan is likely to be divided between JUI-F and Baloch nationalist parties. If the nationalist forces come together, which does not seem impossible now, they may score an unprecedented electoral success in the province. If the PPP forms an alliance with these forces, the combine will be even more formidable.

In all likelihood, Pakistan is heading for a hung Assembly with the existing political groups and alliances. The uncertainties can change the direction of Pakistani politics ? towards or away from democracy ? but not the electoral prospects of the political groups seeking power through ballot. Unforeseen events such as assassination of prominent political leaders could, however, change the situation dramatically.

The only institution that will survive all uncertainties is the Pakistan Army, with or without Musharraf. It is the only professionally organised political force in Pakistan that has been perpetually in power and seeking more power in opportune moments. With Musharraf it has substantial support from the moderates. Even with plummeting approval ratings if Musharraf still carries a significant 21% support. But for his 'unforced errors' in recent months, he would still be on top. Even his worst critics admit that but for his overriding zeal to stay in power, his hands are clean and he is more open to criticism than any of his predecessors in uniform.

In case the Army considers it necessary to dump Musharraf if his popularity shrinks further and political forces muster up nationwide support against him and take to the streets in the worst-case scenario, the Army will hardly lose anything by getting back to the barracks and calling the shots from there. Musharraf has obliged the US too much, too long, and is sure to be rewarded with a comfortable retirement in some posh villa in the West.

However, it is highly improbable that the hopelessly divided political forces would come together to pose a challenge to the Army and force it to stay in the barracks. Rather, they would like the Army to stay on as a prop, an insurance against any ambitious politician who would seek dictatorial power by manipulating the democratic system. The Army, on its part, will never be in a position to rule directly for long. It will seek collaborators and fragment the political forces and usher in an imperfect democratic system that may keep the door open for the Army in the future. The future of Pakistan has its roots in its past. The more things change, the more they will remain the same.

(Source: Asian Affairs)