The New Nation - Internet Edition

Bahey Eldin Hassan

The Arab world is living on the edge of a volcano as a result of the ever volatile interaction of a number of elements: the increasing influence and spread of terrorist groups; escalating Sunni-Shia sectarian violence; the phenomenon of private non- political militias; the growing influence of religious extremism within both the political and social realms; increased political authoritarianism; the continuing entrenchment of the police state; the increasing targeting o human rights defenders and democracy advocates within the larger regional context of a qualitative deterioration in the conditions of human rights in general; and finally, constant signs of probable civil and/or regional wars in and between a number of countries.

The "death boats" crossing the Mediterranean in the hope of ataining a blissful life in a European "paradise", the continuing waves of suicide bombers hoping to reach "eternal paradise", and the millions of Iraqi and Sudanese refugees crossing fault lines in Iraq and Sudan, or crossing seas and borders (even those of Israel) are only the warning flares of an eruption starting to rumble.

When fully active, the lava of this volcano will flow across all borders and beyond expectations, so much so that the "new 9/11" will be much worse than even what the most pessimistic expect Reaching this point was never inevitable; a number of factors have contributed to the creation of the current situation.At the forefront of these factors is the ebbing of the fourth wave of democratisation in the Arab world.

After three global waves of democratic transformation failed to sweep over the forbidding shores of the Arab world, the fourth wave broke at the edge of its impregnable fortifications, content to have swept over the defences of Serbia, Georgia and the Ukraine. This despite the fact that on its way to the shores of the Arab world the fourth wave had tremendous impetus towards this particular area, in large part due to the 9/11 atacks and the bombings in London and Madrid and ensuing specially-designed plans, whether European (the "Neighbourhood Policy"), American (the "Partnership Initiative") or international (the G8's "Forum for the Future"), which included the earmarking and disbursement of millions of dollars for these purposes.

Characteristic of the ebbing of the fourth wave of democratisation are: the waning of the EU's political will regarding the Neighbourhood Policy in the Arab world; the G8's Forum for the Future giving up its main objective, which was to be a forum for equal dialogue between Arab governments and civil society so that concrete steps on the reform process could be taken; the transformation of the US Middle East Partnership Initiative into a mere giant financial arm for money-pumping; the serious deterioration, verging on collapse, in the performance of forces advocating reform from within Arab societies; new international actors (Russia, China and Iran) that stand opposed to the international democratic agenda -- indeed, any democratic agenda -- and that are influential in political and economic action in the region at a time when American influence is waning, and will continue to do so, after the failure of the Iraq project

The first three indicators took clear shape after the Muslim Brothrhood won 20 per cent of the seats of the Egyptian parliament in December 2005, and after Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian elections in January 2006.

In reality, the process of deterioration was not slow; it was more like the proverb of "the straw that broke the camel's back." From the very moment these successive international initiatives for reform in the Arab world were announced they lacked the 2 necessary political will to drive them resolutely towards achieving their goals. They were more like declarations of political intent then an accurate diagnosis accompanied by practical plans.

The tug of war has not been setled between European and American priorities for security in the Arab world (which mainly require ensuring the stability of current regimes in most Arab countries) and the new post-9/11 priority of democratiation at the expense of these regimes.

The schism between Europe and the US is not only one regarding the legitimacy and wisdom of the invasion of Iraq, but also one relating to the central idea of the project of democratic reform in the Arab world (ie the supposed close connection between ailing democracy and the generation of terrorism).

Meanwhile, the US seems inescapably schizophrenic: on one hand it calls for the respecting of human rights in the Arab world, and on the other commits some of the most blatant violations of human rights witnessed anywhere, in Guantanamo and Abu- Ghraib and elsewhere. In the morning they call for democratic reform in some countries and at night they use the secret prisons of those same countries to torture those whom the CIA's illegal extraordinary rendition flights deliver for the purpose of extorting confessions. On top of this is the Bush administration's public defence of a noncommitment to human rights standards (epecially with regards torture) or international humanitarian law (especially in relation to prisoners at Guantanamo).

The incorrect diagnosis of the character of most of Arab ruling regimes -- as having a will to reform while in fact they stand against it -- played a role in blocking financial assistance to true advocates of reform and civil society organisations.

A great part of foreign financial assistance went to concerned governments and governmental organisations under the illusion that it would be used to turn the wheels of reform. Otherwise it went into programmes imported from the experiences of countries en route to democratisation, and which are not suitable for authoritarian and anti-democratic states.

The "Tunisian model" crystallises the value of international reform initiatives. Tunisia has been the spoilt child of the E, before and after international calls for reform. It is also the location chosen by the US for the administrative headquarters of its initiative to democratise the Arab world. Yet in two years of loud talk about reform, the Tunisian police state has not stopped for a moment its practices of violent repression, even during the convening of the UN World Summit on the Information Society, the government freezing European financial assistance to leading Tunisian human rights organisations without any European or American reaction commensurate to such humiliation.

In this context, it is not surprising that the US State Department considers Egypt's new constitutional changes, which aim at entrenching the foundations of the police state and endowing its practices with constitutional protection, as a step on the road to reform. Nor was it surprising that the EU blessed these changes indirectly by limiting its criticism to the fact that they were passed hastily thrugh parliament, as if rapidity of promulgation overshadowed the spirit and leter of the worst legislative and constitutional setback in Egypt since July 1952.

Indeed, the best example to express the emptiness of the American project to democratise the Arab world is the fact that the very state on which they bet to lead the democratic transformation in the region -- Egypt -- has been precisely the one that adeptly led a systematic counter-offensive on local, regional and international levels, becoming, through this counter- offensive, even more despotic and authoritarian than before the American project was launched.

The fact is that the wave of democratic reform was exhausted before it reached Arab shores. Hence, with the return of Europe and the US to their pre-9/11 positions, the fourth wave left behind no significant mark on the ground; neither an instance of reform, whether constitutional, legislatie or institutional, nor any change in power relations.

With the exception of Morocco and latest developments in Mauritania, ruling regimes in Arab countries lack the necessary will to embark on political reform. Hence all their energy during 2004-5 was spent trying to relieve and absorb external and internal pressures. Much effort also went into exacerbating contradictions on the other fronts, whether internal or external, making alliances with the devil to forestall reform.

The outstanding adroitness with which the Arab ruling regimes, under the leadership of Egypt, managed this decisive crisis deserves to be an object of study in crisis management If only these regimes had been managing their societies and providing for their needs with a mere five per cent of this adeptness they might not have needed to reform! How did Arab regims respond?

First, by claiming that they have changed their skin and decided to respond to calls for reform; then by raising the slogan of Arab society "cultural specificity", and that reform comes only "from within"; raising the slogan of gradualism, arguing that the democratisation process took hundreds of years in European societies; and trying to undermine international consensus on the importance of reform in the Arab world and the methods of bringing it about by seeking to widen the gap between positions within the US political class and between the EU and the US.

Further, Arab regimes furnished Europe and the US with atractive offers for servicing their security interests in the region, especially given the rise of new regional security challenges in light of the following: the evident failure of the American project in Iraq; Hamas reaching power in Palestine; the rise of Iran as a regional power; and the exacerbation of the threat of exported terorism.

Yet such offers did not involve practical contributions to ending any conflict for the common strategy of Arab regimes has always been to keep regional conflicts hot, in order to stoke national security concerns at all times. Such concerns are employed with Arab peoples and the political and cultural elite in order to keep their atention focused on the "external enemy", thus indirectly supporting the legitimacy of no internal change. This strategy stops short of leting these conflicts heat up to the extent of threatening the interests of Arab regimes.

Arab regimes are also skilful in the use of Islamists as a scarecrow to dampen enthusiasm for reform, whether on the part of the international community or local political class -- liberals, leftists, secularists and nationalists. Egypt offers the best example. The last parliamentary elections for the first time took place wthout any member of the Muslim Brotherhood in prison. They had been all released several days before to enjoy, during the first round, the best political and security atmosphere in Egypt in the last 25 years!

This had direct results, as the Muslim Brotherhood was able to hold 20 per cent of parliament It was an excellent tactical win for the Islamists, yet it turned into a strategic win for the Egyptian regime, and other Arab regimes, as it helped setle the debate about European and American priorities to the benefit of regional security interests and at the expense of democratic reform in the Arab world.

(The failure of the Middle East democratisation project is not something to celebrate, even if outside forces championed it; it prefaces the disintegration of the Arab world, writes Bahey Eldin Hassan)